Manufacturers\u27 Liability for Defective Product Designs:  The Triumph of Risk-Utility by Twerski, Aaron D. & Henderson, James A., Jr.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 74
Issue 3
SYMPOSIUM:
The Products Liability Restatement: Was it a
Success?
Article 16
2009
Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product
Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility
Aaron D. Twerski
James A. Henderson Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson Jr., Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74
Brook. L. Rev. (2009).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol74/iss3/16
1061 
Manufacturers’ Liability for 
Defective Product Designs: 
The Triumph of Risk-Utility 
Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr.† 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1061 
II. THE TREATMENT OF DESIGN DEFECT IN THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ........................ 1062 
A. Recognizing a Fault-Based Standard for Defective Design ............................ 1063 
B. Protecting Against Category Liability ........................................................... 1069 
III. THE TREATMENT OF DESIGN DEFECT IN THE “REACHING CONSENSUS” ARTICLE ..... 1071 
IV. DESIGN DEFECTS IN THE COURTS: A LOOK AT THE LAST DECADE ........................... 1073 
A. Consumer Expectations Rhetoric and Reality: The Illinois Experience .......... 1073 
B. Liability Without Rhetoric: The Missouri Experience ................................... 1077 
C. Reasonable Alternative Design Is the Strong Majority Rule for  
Classic Design Defect Cases .......................................................................... 1079 
D. Risk-Utility Balancing: Reasonable Alternative Design Not Required ............ 1094 
E. The Two-Prong Test for Defect ..................................................................... 1098 
F. The Pure Consumer Expectation States ........................................................ 1104 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 1106 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article marks a notable anniversary for its authors. Ten 
years ago, in 1998, we celebrated the publication of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, on which we served as co-
Reporters,1 and we coauthored and published an article claiming that 
American courts had reached a consensus regarding the standard by 
which to judge whether a product design is defective.2 This Article 
reviews what has happened in the decade since then and concludes that 
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 1 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1998). 
 2 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective 
Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 868-72, 887, 893-901 (1998) [hereinafter Henderson & 
Twerski, Achieving Consensus]. 
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we got it right the first time. Beyond simply sharing our current research 
with the reader, we want to shed some new light on how the Restatement 
came to be the way it is and to explain how and why the consensus we 
described earlier remains rock solid. The Restatement project and the 
consensus article are linked because the standard that virtually all 
American courts use in judging product designs is the one we included in 
section 2(b) of the Restatement—whether the defendant manufacturer 
could have adopted a safer alternative design and whether failure to do so 
“renders the product not reasonably safe.”3 As this Article explains, trial 
courts vary somewhat (though less now than ten years ago) in what they 
say to juries; and appellate courts vary somewhat (less now) in the 
rhetoric they use to write their opinions; but in the overwhelming 
majority of American jurisdictions, claims of defective design reach 
triers of fact only when the plaintiff offers plausible proof that her 
injuries would have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design.4  
II. THE TREATMENT OF DESIGN DEFECT IN THE RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) 
When we started work as co-Reporters in 1992, we understood 
that the products liability project would address a number of issues that 
would, in varying degrees, be controversial. How should component 
parts suppliers be treated?5 Commercial used-product sellers?6 How 
should crashworthiness claims be sorted out?7 Should a robust post-sale 
duty to warn be implemented?8 We knew that each of these issues would 
generate vigorous debate and controversy. But we also knew that none 
would surpass in intensity the controversy surrounding the proper 
standard for defective product design. The reason for this had more to do 
with rhetoric than substance. For thirty years, American courts across the 
country had been applying a fault-based risk-utility standard in reviewing 
the defectiveness of product designs.9 But over the same period, most of 
these courts had been explicitly referring to section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which trumpeted strict liability as the 
  
 3 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998). 
 4 See infra Part IV.  
 5 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 5 (1998). 
 6 See id. § 8. 
 7 See id. § 16. 
 8 See id. § 10. 
 9 See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. AND AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: 
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 177-78 (6th ed. 2008); DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 8.4 
(2005) [hereinafter OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW]. See generally Sheila L. Birnbaum, 
Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to 
Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980). 
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operative rule.10 So long as the inherent contradiction between applying a 
fault standard to determine liability and using strict liability rhetoric to 
explain the outcome continued unchallenged, all had gone smoothly 
enough. But to come along in a new Restatement and point out the 
obvious inconsistency would seem, to those who truly believed in the 
myth of strict liability, nothing short of heresy. 
Another aspect of developing an acceptable standard for 
defective design would have to be addressed. Even if we could count on 
reasonable minds to see that the operative standard for defective design 
was rooted in risk-utility balancing, it was not so clear that reasonable 
minds would agree that only a marginal, rather than an aggregative, 
approach would be acceptable. Marginal risk-utility analysis asks 
whether the manufacturer could have adopted a safer, cost-effective 
version within the broader category of design into which the defendant’s 
product falls; aggregative risk-utility asks whether the risks of the 
broader category outweigh, in the aggregate, the category’s social utility. 
Under category liability, even inherently, unavoidably unsafe product 
designs that cannot be redesigned to be significantly safer may be 
deemed defective if their aggregate risks are found to outweigh their 
aggregate utilities. We knew that American courts have never imposed 
category liability for very good reasons.11 but we were concerned that an 
unintended consequence of convincing ALI members that risk-utility, not 
strict liability, was the operative standard for defective design would be 
to give category liability new-found (and undeserved) respectability. 
A. Recognizing a Fault-Based Standard for Defective Design 
The first task we undertook as Reporters was to divide the 
concept of product defect into three subcategories that American courts 
had come to recognize: (1) manufacturing defects, (2) design defects, and 
(3) failures to warn (marketing defects).12 The drafters and promoters of 
section 402A in the early 1960s had relied almost entirely on 
manufacturing defects which, because they could be defined 
mechanically without reference to notions of unreasonable risk, could 
serve as the basis for strict liability.13 Because the drafters of section 
402A had in mind only manufacturing defects, they saw no reason to 
distinguish among the other types of defects to which their strict liability 
  
 10 See, e.g., Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978) (applying 
an “unreasonably dangerous” risk-utility test for defective design, the court insists it is imposing 
“strict liability” under section 402A). 
 11 See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American 
Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263 
(1991) [hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier]; David G. Owen, Toward a Proper 
Test for Design Defectiveness: “Micro Balancing” Costs and Benefits, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1661 (1997). 
 12 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §§ 1-2 (1998).  
 13 See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 9, § 7.2. 
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rule might apply.14 To be sure, the drafters of section 402A appear also to 
have relied on a special subset of design defects involving products that 
malfunction, thereby failing to perform their manifestly intended 
function in a self-defeating manner.15 In those special design cases the 
defects are functionally equivalent to manufacturing defects, so strict 
liability works as well for them. Indeed, manufacturing and design 
malfunction defects may be said to disappoint consumer expectations 
and thus may be deemed defective on that basis. By contrast, courts 
generally dealt with failures to warn under the negligence rubric, often 
outside the bounds of section 402A.16 After all, the defendant’s “failure” 
to provide adequate warnings carried with it a built-in negligent quality 
not involving any shortcoming inherent in the product itself. So far, so 
good. The critical analytical error that many courts and commentators 
made in the post-section 402A developmental period was to assume that 
product designs that were unreasonably dangerous, but neither self-
defeating nor prone to malfunction, could be dealt with under the same 
section 402A strict liability rubric as could manufacturing defects and 
malfunctioning, self-defeating designs. Because virtually no such 
mainstream design cases reached juries in the 1960s and early 1970s,17 
the incoherence of purporting to hold manufacturers strictly liable for 
their negligent design choices did not surface.18 Observers of the 
developing American products liability system simply assumed that the 
strict liability rule in section 402A applied not only to manufacturing 
defects but to all manners of design defects, as well. 
As mainstream design cases19 began to reach juries in greater 
numbers in the 1970s and 1980s, many courts came to understand that a 
fault-based, reasonableness standard was necessary with which to 
determine design defects. But the “strict liability under section 402A” 
rhetoric persisted, notwithstanding the underlying reality that fault of the 
manufacturer was the determinative consideration. Thus, the two 
significant implications of dividing the defect concept into its three 
separate constituents were (1) the requirement that we squarely face the 
question of what the basis of liability should be for mainstream, “classic” 
  
 14 George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2301, 2303 (1989). 
 15 See Michael D. Green, The Unappreciated Congruity of the Second and Third Torts 
Restatements on Design Defects, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 807 (2009).  
 16 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products 
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 271-72 (1990) [hereinafter 
Henderson & Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse]. 
 17 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design 
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1546-52 (1973) [hereinafter 
Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design Choices]; Henderson & Twerski, 
Achieving Consensus, supra note 2, at 891.  
 18 See Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1984); Birnbaum, supra 
note 9, at 600-01.  
 19 We have referred to design cases not involving product malfunction as “classic” 
design cases. See Henderson & Twerski, Achieving Consensus, supra note 2, at 876-77.  
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design defects; and (2) the necessity that we bring failure to warn cases, 
clearly resting on risk-utility balancing, within the umbrella concept of 
product defect. The first of these implications is of primary interest here. 
We have dealt with the second elsewhere.20 At the outset, we were 
tempted to recognize that classic design defects reflected negligence on 
the part of the manufacturer in parallel fashion to failure to warn. But we 
knew that many courts were deeply committed to section 402A’s “strict 
liability” rhetoric, and might reject the new Restatement out-of-hand for 
that reason, without giving it a fair hearing.21 So we decided to capture in 
plain words the essence of Learned Hand’s classic formulation for 
negligence,22 in which the plaintiff must show that a precaution (an 
alternative design) could have been adopted at acceptable costs (failure 
to adopt renders the defendant’s product not reasonably safe), and that 
failure to adopt the precaution caused the plaintiff’s injuries. The black 
letter of the new Restatement makes no mention of “negligence” or 
“fault;” it leaves such language to the comments.23 Thus, under the new 
Restatement, a court is free to adopt or reaffirm the substantive, risk-
utility standard that American courts had been applying for decades prior 
to our work and at the same time continue to insist that manufacturers are 
strictly liable for harm caused by design defects.24 Of course, nothing 
prevents courts from embracing the risk-utility standard openly; by now, 
a majority of courts have done exactly that. But nothing in the 
Restatement forces courts to do so. 
Observe that the distinction here drawn between risk-utility 
balancing and strict liability is not bridged merely by holding the 
manufacturer responsible for time-of-trial knowledge of risk and risk-
avoidance technology that may not have been available at the time of 
original sale. Although doing so could be characterized as imposing 
“strict liability” in the sense that the manufacturer might not have been 
negligent in failing to discover risk and risk-avoidance information that 
was unknowable at time of sale, the standard for judging the design 
nevertheless involves risk-utility balancing at time of trial. Although 
most American courts do not hold product sellers responsible for 
information not available at time of sale,25 even the small minority that 
do are committed to judging product designs based on risk-utility 
balancing. 
A true non-risk-utility approach to holding manufacturers liable 
for the generic risks presented by their products would be to hold them 
liable for all the harm their products cause—to let actual causation 
  
 20 See Henderson & Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse, supra note 16.  
 21 We did not want to be remembered, fairly or not, as “the guys who tried to kill strict 
products liability.” 
 22 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 23 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmts. a, d (1998). 
 24 See id. § 2 cmt. n. 
 25 See HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 9, at 197-99, 341-52. 
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determine liability. Elsewhere we have referred to such an approach as 
“enterprise liability”26 and have argued that it would be unworkable. Not 
only is actual causation an inadequate basis for sorting out claims in 
court—without a requirement of defect, everything ends up being a cause 
in fact of everything else—but also no one could insure against the 
relevant losses because of high levels of moral hazard—product users 
would have inadequate incentives to use products carefully.27 Not 
surprisingly, our courts have never adopted such an approach, or even 
considered it seriously.28 But what a number of courts have considered is 
basing design-based liability on the disappointment of consumer 
expectations. Historically, such an approach traces its pedigree to 
comment i to section 402A, in which the drafters justified their new rule 
of strict liability by pointing to the disappointment of consumer 
expectations that defect-caused product failures cause.29 Earlier in this 
analysis we explained how manufacturing defects and self-defeating 
designs trigger product malfunctions that disappoint expectations of safe 
product performance. That is clearly what the drafters had in mind when 
they authored comment i. But if the courts were to extend the consumer 
expectations concept to include situations in which products perform 
exactly as intended but nonetheless cause injury, a form of strict, 
enterprise liability would be achieved. Even if the accident could not 
have been avoided cost-effectively by redesigning the product, liability 
could be imposed because the mere fact that the product caused injury 
could be found to have disappointed consumer expectations of safe 
product usage. 
Of course, this new expectations-based rule of quasi-enterprise 
liability would not require the imposition of liability upon a showing that 
the defendant’s product caused harm. Under a true enterprise liability 
approach, causation, alone, would require the imposition of liability, but 
not here. To impose liability under the approach being considered here, 
in addition to a finding of causation, the trier of fact would also be 
required to find that the happening of the accident disappointed 
consumer expectations. Presumably, if the product-related risks were 
fairly obvious, a jury could conclude that a product did not disappoint 
expectations even if it helped to cause a terrible accident.30 Bearing in 
mind that jurors, in determining whether expectations were disappointed, 
draw on their own life experiences rather than rely on proof adduced by 
  
 26 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV. 377 
passim (2002); see also Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 11, at 1276-97. 
 27  See Henderson, supra note 26, at 390-400.  
 28 Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design Choices, supra note 
17, at 1554; see also Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 11, at 1292, 1296-97.  
 29 See HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 9, at 254-69. 
 30 See id. at 269-78. 
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the parties,31 it would not be unfair to characterize such a quasi-enterprise 
liability approach as one based on the jury’s whim.32  
This foray into the possibility that courts might pursue a quasi-
enterprise-liability, “jury’s whim” approach to design defects based on 
the disappointment of consumer expectations would seem puzzlingly 
unnecessary save for one critical fact—that is exactly the path that critics 
of the Restatement project have pursued in opposing the adoption of a 
risk-utility, reasonable-alternative-design approach to defective design. 
Besides knowing full well when we began work as Reporters that the 
operative design defect standard in most states was fault-based risk-
utility balancing, we were also aware that a minority of states insisted 
that the operative standard was the disappointment of consumer 
expectations.33 Without having yet undertaken a thorough canvassing of 
all states, we had assumed that no jurisdiction would knowingly embrace 
an amorphous, jury-whim approach and that one or more of the 
following explanations accounted for all such judicial references to 
consumer expectations: (1) references to “reasonable expectations” 
incorporated risk-utility balancing, and thus the standard to which courts 
referred was, in actuality, a fault-based standard; (2) the courts that 
referred to consumer expectations did so only in the context of self-
defeating designs that caused products to malfunction; or (3) even if the 
references to expectations were not limited to reasonable expectations, 
and even if the references were made in the context of classic design 
litigation not involving product malfunctions, trial courts sent design 
claims to juries only when plaintiffs produced credible proof of 
reasonable alternative designs that would have avoided the plaintiffs’ 
harm. 
In addition to these common-sense assumptions regarding the 
prevailing case law, we also knew that virtually every major torts scholar 
who had looked carefully at the issue of design defect over the past 
several decades had embraced risk-utility balancing and had rejected the 
consumer expectations test as unworkable and unwise.34 A small handful 
of writers, including two who wrote advocacy pieces only after the 
  
 31 See Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 305-06 (Cal. 1994). 
 32 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intuition and Technology in 
Product Design Litigation: An Essay on Proximate Causation, 88 GEO. L. J. 659, 681 (2000). 
 33 See infra notes 188-200 and accompanying text. 
 34 See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 9, at 611-18; Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: 
In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1217, 1235-37 (1993); Richard A. 
Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C. L. REV. 643, 649-52 (1978); 
Michael D. Green, The Schizophrenia of Risk-Benefit Analysis in Design Defect Litigation, 48 
VAND. L. REV. 609, 613-15 (1995); W. Page Keeton, Products Liability—Design Hazards and the 
Meaning of Defect, 10 CUMB. L. REV. 293, 300-05 (1979); David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: 
Exploding the “Strict” Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 760-61; William Powers 
Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 639, 646-47, 652-
54; Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435, 478-81 
(1979); John Wade, On Product “Design Defects” and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551, 
566-71 (1980).  
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Restatement revision project was well under way, urged adoption of the 
consumer expectations test. These authors insisted that the risk-utility 
standard lacked support in the case law and placed an unfair burden on 
plaintiffs by requiring them to provide technical proof that a safer, harm-
preventing alternative design would have been feasible.35 The consumer 
expectations test was fair, they argued, because all that it required 
plaintiffs to prove was that the product, even if reasonably safe, had been 
instrumental in causing them to suffer harm. 
Lending an aura of plausibility to these otherwise implausible 
anti-risk-utility arguments was the fact that the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut purported to reject the Restatement’s reasonable-alternative-
design standard in 1997, while we were still working with a tentative 
draft of the relevant section. The plaintiff in Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic 
Tool Co.,36 an industrial injury case, had proven several alternative 
designs and clearly would have reached the jury under the Restatement 
rule; the issue on appeal was how to instruct the jury after a trial almost 
entirely devoted to how the defendant could have designed the product 
more safely so as to avoid causing the plaintiff injury.37 Although a 
majority approved an opinion that explicitly rejected the new 
Restatement’s approach in the abstract, it recognized an exception for 
complex cases that came so close to actually embracing the 
Restatement’s approach that a concurring justice chastised the majority 
for seemingly contradicting itself.38 At the time, the Connecticut decision 
seemed so out of place in the factual context of the actual case as to 
appear artificially contrived in an effort to embarrass the Restatement 
project. Interestingly, our recent research for this Article reveals that no 
plaintiff in a reported case in Connecticut has ever reached the jury in a 
classic design case without proving that a safer, reasonable alternative 
design was available at time of sale.39 It thus appears that the Connecticut 
high court could not have meant what it said in 1997 about there being 
no requirement that the availability of an alternative design be proven. 
But there it was—the Connecticut Supreme Court had gone out of its 
way to reject the tentative draft of our section on design defect. We could 
  
 35 Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI Restatement 
Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 665-68 (1995); Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability Section 2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 
1407 (1994). In a more recent article, Douglas Kysar argues that the consumer expectations test as 
advocated by the critics of the Products Liability Restatement is too amorphous and vague but sets 
forth a consumer expectations test based on scientific and behavioral testimony of experts. Douglas 
A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700 (2003). The authors responded 
in James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Consumer Expectations Last Hope: A Response to 
Professor Kysar, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1791 (2003).  
 36 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997). 
 37  See id. at 1324-25. 
 38 See id. at 1356 (Berdon, J., concurring) (“[A]dopting such a risk-utility test for 
‘complex product designs’ sounds dangerously close to requiring proof of the existence of ‘a 
reasonable alternative design,’ a standard of proof that the court properly rejects today.”). 
 39 See infra notes 179-181 and accompanying text. 
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only hope that our reasoning and our research would persuade the 
American Law Institute membership that Connecticut’s contrived, 
abstract essay in support of a consumer expectations test had gotten it 
dead wrong.  
The end-result of all these deliberations was section 2(b), which 
requires the plaintiff to prove that the manufacturer could have adopted a 
reasonable alternative design and that failure to do so renders the product 
not reasonably safe. Comment g to section 2 states explicitly that 
disappointment of consumer expectations, while relevant, does not 
provide an independent basis on which to find that a product design is 
defective.40 A Reporter’s Note explains that, while a small minority of 
states purport to adopt the consumer expectations test, a clear majority 
rely on a risk-utility/reasonable-alternative-design standard to determine 
whether a design is defective.41  
B. Protecting Against Category Liability 
The second major aspect of the Restatement’s treatment of 
liability for defective design concerned the need to protect against the 
possibility that the risk-utility approach would invite courts to condemn 
as defective entire categories of inherently dangerous products, even if 
those products could not be redesigned to be made safer.42 The idea 
behind category liability was that, under a negligence regime, a 
manufacturer could be found at fault for distributing certain inherently 
risky products in the first instance, even if those products could not be 
designed differently so as to make them safer.43 For example, alcoholic 
beverages must, almost by definition, contain alcohol to be attractive to 
those who desire to consume such products. Removing the alcohol does 
not merely make such beverages safer for those who consume them 
abusively, it also destroys their utility for everyone, including the 
significant majority who do not abuse them. American courts have never 
imposed category liability, mainly because they intuitively (and 
correctly) understand that it would constitute an abuse of judicial power 
to decide which broad categories of products should not be distributed at 
all. Such sweeping regulation, courts have concluded, should be left to 
legislatures to undertake.44 But if the new Restatement were overtly to 
  
 40 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g (1998). 
 41 See id. § 2 Reporters’ Note, cmt. d, II.C.-D. (1998). 
 42 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 43 Some advisers likened this form of distributor’s negligence to negligent entrustment. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. 
LIAB. § 2 cmt. n (1998).  
 44 See, e.g., Rose v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 855 N.Y.S.2d 119, 124-26 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (claim that negligent product design of regular cigarettes based on 
availability of “light” cigarettes with lower tar and nicotine was dismissed because “light” cigarettes 
are not a substitute for regular cigarettes and to impose liability would declare a whole category of 
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embrace a risk-utility standard in broad terms, we feared that our 
formulation might invite courts to look more kindly on the proposition 
that certain categories of products are sufficiently dangerous that it 
would be negligent to distribute them in the first instance. 
Besides lawyers who represent plaintiffs in products liability 
litigation, who would have been delighted to see our Restatement project 
endorse the idea that broad categories of inherently risky products might 
be deemed defective even if no alternative designs could have reduced 
the risks, two groups of American Law Institute constituents with 
seemingly more objective, disinterested viewpoints supported 
formulations that we believed might encourage courts to embrace 
category liability. The first group urged us to replace the more specific, 
reasonable alternative design standard for defect with the broader 
principle of designs that presented unreasonable risks, and then explained 
in a comment that the best way to prove that a product design’s risks 
were unreasonable would be to prove that a reasonable, safer alternative 
design could have been adopted.45 The other group of seemingly 
disinterested critics urged that we include in the black letter explicit 
language making clear that a manufacturer could be found to be at fault 
for distributing certain highly-though-unavoidably-risky product designs 
in the first instance.46 We resisted these suggestions on the ground that 
the clear implication would have been that a category of products might 
be found to present unreasonable risks even if those risks were not 
avoidable by the adoption of a safer alternative.  
In the end, we responded to the entreaties from both of these 
camps of disinterested, otherwise supportive critics by retaining the 
“proof of a reasonable alternative design” formulation and addressing the 
substance of their concerns in comments. Comments a and d to section 2 
make clear that the foundational principle for design and marketing 
liability is the unreasonable risk concept that underlies negligence,47 and 
the last paragraph of comment n to section 2 explains that some negligent 
marketing doctrines, such as negligent entrustment, fall outside the reach 
of the Products Liability Restatement.48 Comment d to section 2 
explicitly asserts that American courts have traditionally refused to 
impose category liability on “products that are generally available and 
widely . . . consumed, even if they pose substantial risks of harm.”49  
  
products to be defective), aff’d sub. nom. Adamo v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 900 
N.E.2d 966 (N.Y. 2008) .  
 45 Professor Harvey S. Perlman, a member of the A.L.I. Council and an advisor to our 
project, was most vocal in urging that we adopt as the design standard the basic normative principle 
underlying the concept of a reasonable alternative design. 
 46 Judge Robert E. Keeton (Advisor) and John P. Frank (Council Member) were the most 
vocal proponents of this position. 
 47 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmts. a, d (1998) (both refer 
explicitly to the negligence principle). 
 48 Cf. id. § 2 cmt. n (1998); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965).  
 49 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998). 
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To the consternation of many American Law Institute members 
who supported our reasonable alternative design approach, we added 
comment e to section 2, recognizing the possibility that courts in the 
future might determine that certain categories of products, other than 
those “generally available and widely . . . consumed” alluded to in 
comment d, might be sufficiently dangerous and of such minimal social 
utility that they would be deemed defective even if no safer alternative 
design was available.50 Why did we include this comment that arguably 
contradicts comment d’s pronouncement against category liability? It 
will be observed that comment d makes clear that section 2(b) of the 
Restatement does not support category liability because American courts 
have never embraced it;51 and comment e speaks merely of the possibility 
that courts might encounter an unusual case in the future—it does not 
endorse or recommend the imposition of category liability.52 But if we 
were genuinely concerned with the possibility that the Restatement’s 
reliance on a risk-utility design standard might invite a movement toward 
category liability, why did we endorse the inclusion of comment e? Quite 
frankly, we were under significant pressure from critics, both interested 
and disinterested, to recognize that limited category liability was at least 
a logical implication of adopting a risk-utility approach to defective 
design. Thus, we decided to “bear hug” that possibility and hopefully 
disarm it by dealing with it forthrightly (and narrowly) in comment e. 
Whether or not it was an error in judgment at the time, we simply 
observe that our fears were unfounded—no court over the past ten years 
has relied on comment e to adopt category liability.53  
III. THE TREATMENT OF DESIGN DEFECT IN THE “REACHING 
CONSENSUS” ARTICLE  
Having just published the Restatement with its “reasonable 
alternative design” requirement for design defects and its rejection of 
consumer expectations as a stand-alone test, why did we feel it was 
necessary in 1998 to publish an article claiming that consensus had been 
achieved? For one thing, it provided the opportunity to update the 
research reflected in the Reporters’ Note to section 2(b). We had finished 
the Note at least two years prior to publication. Perhaps more 
importantly, a law review article provided us the opportunity to explain 
  
 50 See id. § 2 cmt. e. 
 51 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 52 The Reporters’ Note to comment e makes this clear. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 Reporters’ Note, cmt. e (1998).  
 53 McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 162, 173 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J., 
dissenting) (citing comment e and arguing that category liability might apply to “Black Talon” 
bullets, which were designed to expose razor sharp claws upon impact to create “hideous, gaping 
wounds”); Parish v. Jumpking, Inc., 719 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Iowa 2006) (court rejected the 
application of comment e to declare a trampoline to be a manifestly unreasonable product).  
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ourselves more openly, free from the understandable constraints we had 
worked under as ALI Reporters.54 Moreover, an article in a law review 
with good circulation would help spread the word more quickly and 
widely than would the publication of the new Restatement by itself, 
however auspicious an event that may have been. 
Because the instant Article undertakes a thorough, state-by-state 
review of American law governing product design liability through early 
2009, we would like briefly to critique the 1998 article. (Thus, even if we 
identify shortcomings in the earlier effort, our research for this Article 
will leave no doubt whatever as to where our courts stand on the relevant 
issues.) In writing the instant Article, we have debated between us 
whether “consensus” was the right word choice for the earlier piece. 
Certainly we intended then (and intend now) to convey the message that 
our courts overwhelmingly embrace a risk-utility/reasonable-alternative-
design approach to determining whether the plaintiff should reach the 
jury with a claim of defective design. However, to the extent that our use 
of the word “consensus” implied that the courts recognize this reality 
self-consciously and rhetorically, we may have overstated our position. 
Then and now, some of the courts that regularly and routinely require 
plaintiffs to adduce plausible proof of a reasonable alternative design 
insist that such proof is not always necessary and explain what they are 
doing in terms of vindicating consumer expectations. Based on reported 
decisions, plaintiffs rarely, if ever, reach the jury in a classic design case 
without proof of a feasible alternative design;55 but a minority of courts 
cling to the myth of strict design liability by clinging rhetorically to the 
consumer expectations rubric.56  
The thoroughness of our research for the instant Article suggests 
the other basis on which the 1998 article may have fallen a bit short. 
Rather than undertake a state-by-state review of the relevant law, as we 
do here, in our earlier article we chose representative examples with 
which to reveal the then-current patterns of judicial and legislative 
decisions. Our current research confirms that our previous assessments 
were accurate. But in addition to being current, the research supporting 
this Article is much broader and deeper. We turn now to examine the 
case law that has developed since the publication of the Products 
Liability Restatement in 1998. 
  
 54 Although Restatement reporters speak for themselves in their Notes—the comments 
are official and speak for the Institute—we felt constrained to avoid the kind of argumentation that 
the law review format allowed. 
 55 See infra notes 57-189 and accompanying text. 
 56 See infra notes 152-202 and accompanying text.  
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IV. DESIGN DEFECTS IN THE COURTS: A LOOK AT THE LAST 
DECADE 
In the ensuing sections we shall demonstrate the overwhelming 
judicial support for the risk-utility/alternative design standard for classic 
design defect cases. We shall begin by showcasing two states (Illinois 
and Missouri) that say that they do not adopt the reasonable alternative 
design standard and show that the rhetoric of these opinions belies the 
reality that a reasonable alternative design is necessary to make out a 
case in those jurisdictions. We shall then turn to the twenty-five states 
whose opinions rather clearly indicate support for section 2(b) of the 
Restatement. Finally, we shall examine the jurisprudence of other states 
whose law on the standard for design defect is somewhat varied, but at 
bottom requires proof of a reasonable alternative design in cases other 
than those where an inference of defect can be made because the product 
caused injury when put to its manifestly intended function. 
A. Consumer Expectations Rhetoric and Reality: The Illinois 
Experience 
If one were to choose a poster child for the proposition that 
empty rhetoric continues to influence how courts articulate the standard 
for design defect, the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in 
Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co.57 would be it. Some brief history is in 
order. In Lamkin v. Towner, decided in 1990, the Supreme Court of 
Illinois adopted a two-pronged test for design defect.58 A plaintiff can 
make out a case for defective design if the product either fails to meet 
consumer expectations or does not meet risk-utility standards.59 Since 
Lamkin, in a series of decisions, the Illinois court has wavered back and 
forth regarding the appropriate role of each test.60 Finally, in Mikolajczyk 
the court sought to set the record straight. James Mikolajczyk, the driver 
of a 1996 Ford Escort, suffered severe, irreversible brain trauma when 
the defendant, a drunk driver, rear-ended his car at high speed. 
  
 57 No. 104983, 2008 WL 4603565 (Ill. Oct. 17, 2008).  
 58 563 N.E.2d 449, 457 (Ill. 1990). 
 59 Id. at 457.  
 60 See, e.g., Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 864 N.E.2d 249, 258-59 (Ill. 2007) (court 
concluded that utility lighter was not categorically exempt from risk-utility test merely because 
product posed an obvious danger to children under a consumer expectations test; plaintiff therefore 
had opportunity to prevail under the risk-utility test even if she failed the consumer expectations 
test); Blue v. Envtl. Eng’g, Inc., 828 N.E.2d 1128, 1143-47 (Ill. 2005) (court discussed applicability 
of section 2(b) to design defect claims based on negligence and strict liability); Hansen v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 764 N.E.2d 35, 46 (Ill. 2002) (court affirmed judgment for plaintiff based on both 
risk-utility test and consumer expectation test when an intravenous catheter that caused fatal air 
embolism could have been designed more safely at low cost and had been marketed as safety device 
and did not present obvious danger). For discussion of the pre-Mikolajczyk debate over design defect 
tests in Illinois, see Aaron D. Twerski, Chasing the Illusory Pot of Gold at the End of the Rainbow: 
Negligence and Strict Liability in Design Defect Litigation, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 7 (2006).  
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Mikolajczyk’s widow brought an action in strict liability against Ford 
Motor Co. and Mazda Motor Corp., claiming that the driver’s seat was 
defectively designed in that it propelled her husband rearward, causing 
him to hit his head on the backseat.61 
Defendants introduced evidence that the seat in the Ford Escort 
met risk-utility standards and provided greater overall safety than an 
alternative design.62 Plaintiff insisted that the jury be allowed to conclude 
that the seat design was defective if it failed to meet consumer 
expectations.63 Defendants urged the court to adopt section 2(b) of the 
Products Liability Restatement.64 The court denied defendants’ request 
on the ground that doing so would require a plaintiff “to plead and prove 
the existence of a feasible alternative design in every case.”65 Then, in an 
interesting turnaround, the court said: 
Although we have declined to adopt section 2 of the Products Liability 
Restatement as a statement of substantive law, we do find its formulation of the 
risk-utility test to be instructive. Under section 2(b) the risk-utility balance is to 
be determined based on consideration of a “broad range of factors,” including  . 
. . the nature and strength of consumer expectations regarding the product, 
including expectations arising from product portrayal and marketing . . . .  
We adopt this formulation of the risk-utility test and hold that when the 
evidence presented by either or both parties supports the application of this 
integrated test, an appropriate instruction is to be given at the request of either 
party. If, however, both parties’ theories of the case are framed entirely in 
terms of consumer expectations, including those based on advertising and 
marketing messages, and/or whether the product was being put to a reasonably 
foreseeable use at the time of the injury, the jury should be instructed only on 
the consumer-expectation test.  
Adoption of this integrated test resolves the question of whether the answer to 
the risk-utility test “trumps” the answer to the consumer-expectation test 
  
 61  Mikolajczyk, 2008 WL 4603565, at *1. 
 62 Id. at *26. The court offered the following summary of defendants’ argument that the 
seat was safe:  
[D]efendants claim the evidence showed that the designers of the CT20 seat had to take 
into account all of the various types of possible collisions (front-end, rear-end, side, 
rollover) that could occur at a wide range of speeds, and with occupants of different sizes, 
who may or may not be properly using their seatbelts, positioned at various seats in the 
vehicle . . . . If the court had given the tendered nonpattern risk-utility instruction instead 
of the pattern instruction, defendants posit, the jury would have been directed to weigh 
this evidence, including expert testimony that the yielding seat that caused James’s death 
might nevertheless have been a safer alternative for other drivers in other types of 
collisions. Defendants also point to testimony by one of their own experts that the 
yielding driver’s seat may have prevented fatal or more serious injury to the backseat 
passenger even while causing more serious injury to James. 
Id. 
 63 Id.  
 64 Id. at *14 (“The rule advocated by defendants is contained in section 2(b) of the 
Products Liability Restatement . . . .”). 
 65 Id. at *15.  
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because the latter is incorporated into the former and is but one factor among 
many for the jury to consider.66  
Rhetoric aside, what is the bottom line of Mikolajczyk? From a 
functional standpoint, it would appear that the consumer expectations test 
is a dead letter in Illinois. In any case in which a plaintiff seeks to 
proceed solely under the consumer expectations test, a defendant need 
only counter with risk-utility evidence to cause the court to apply the 
factors set forth in section 2, comment f. Under that test, consumer 
expectations are but one factor among other risk-utility factors to be 
considered in deciding whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. 
Conversely, when a defendant defends on the ground that a product 
meets consumer expectations, perhaps because the risks are obvious, a 
plaintiff need only introduce risk-utility evidence for the court to apply 
risk-utility balancing. The only cases in which risk-utility balancing will 
not come into play are those in which a product fails to perform its 
manifestly intended function and in which defective design can be 
inferred from the fact of injury. There can be no rational risk-utility 
defense to a product that simply cannot do what it was designed to do. If 
the steering mechanism of a car fails when it is driven out of the 
dealership, one cannot say it was reasonably designed to fail in this 
manner. That contingency is, however, covered by section 3 of the 
Restatement, which allows a court to apply a res ipsa-like inference of 
defect when defect can easily be inferred from the mere occurrence of 
the accident.67  
Two matters deserve comment. First, even if consumer 
expectations cannot serve as the sole test for defect, they are certainly 
relevant to risk-utility balancing. Thus, how a product is perceived by 
consumers implicates how the product will be used and ultimately affects 
the probability that the product may cause harm. The Learned Hand risk-
utility formula takes into account both the probability and gravity of the 
harm and weighs both of these factors against the burden of taking 
precaution against the harm. As the Illinois court correctly observes, 
reasonable consumer expectations are one factor among many in 
deciding whether a product is unreasonably dangerous.68 Second, a 
product that fails reasonable consumer expectations may still meet risk-
utility norms. Indeed, with regard to the Ford Escort, the court noted that 
a consumer might reasonably expect that the driver’s seat would not 
collapse upon impact and cause serious injury.69 Nonetheless, it may be 
that the seat utilized by Ford is the one that provides the greatest overall 
  
 66 Id. at *22 (internal citations omitted and second emphasis added).  
 67 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (1998).  
 68 Mikolajczyk, 2008 WL 4603565, at *22.  
 69 Id. at *23 (“Rear-end collisions are reasonably foreseeable and the ordinary consumer 
would likely expect that a seat would not collapse rearward in such an accident, allowing the 
occupant to sustain massive head injury.”). 
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safety and that an alternative design that would have saved the plaintiff 
from injury in the rare case of a high-speed, rear-end collision would 
present greater dangers to occupants of the Ford Escort in collisions of 
lesser intensity that occur with much greater frequency.70 It was for that 
reason that the court insisted that the Mikolajczyk case be retried and that 
the jury be given a risk-utility instruction in which consumer 
expectations are taken into consideration as a relevant, but not a 
controlling, factor.71  
Now to the big question. Why did the Illinois court not adopt 
section 2(b) as the standard for design defect, utilizing the factors set 
forth in comment f in deciding whether the manufacturer should have 
adopted a reasonable alternative design? One answer might be that, 
desiring to retain the consumer expectations test in cases where risk-
utility evidence is not forthcoming from either side, the court felt 
constrained to reject section 2(b), which it said insists that a plaintiff 
present evidence of a reasonable alternative design as a sina qua non in 
every design defect case. As a practical matter in cases where risk-utility 
evidence is presented by either party, the factors set forth in comment f 
are all relevant to whether an alternative design is reasonable and should 
have been adopted. Thus, the court’s rejection of section 2(b) has little 
meaning.  
A second answer might be that the court was scared off by 
plaintiff’s argument that requiring a reasonable alternative design was a 
new invention foisted onto plaintiffs by the Reporters of the Products 
Liability Restatement and was somehow harsher than risk-utility 
balancing.72 This view has been voiced by other courts.73 It is dead 
wrong. In any risk-utility balancing the answer depends on whether there 
was a safer alternative available that would have been preferable. Those 
courts that profess to do risk-utility balancing and yet take the position 
that the availability of a reasonable alternative design is only one 
relevant factor in risk-utility balancing fail to understand the basics of 
risk-utility analysis. Under risk-utility balancing in products litigation, a 
product may be found to be unreasonably dangerous in only two ways: 
(1) the product should have been more safely designed; or (2) the product 
  
 70 See supra note 62.  
 71 Mikolajczyk, 2008 WL 4603565, at *29 (“Although defendants were not prevented 
from introducing evidence regarding the risks and benefits of the alternative designs that were 
feasible at the time, and were not prevented from arguing to the jury that, on balance, the CT20 seat 
was not ‘unreasonably dangerous’ because it prevented more injuries than it caused, the jury was 
specifically instructed to focus its deliberations solely on whether the seat was unsafe when put to a 
reasonably foreseeable use. The lack of a risk-utility instruction . . . prejudiced defendants’ ability to 
obtain a full, fair, and comprehensive review of the issues by the jury.”).  
 72 Id. at *14-15. 
 73 See, e.g., Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 751 (Wis. 2001) 
(“[W]e are . . . troubled by the fact that 2(b) sets the bar higher for recovery in strict products 
liability design defect cases than in comparable negligence cases.”). 
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category should not have been marketed at all.74 The first conclusion 
depends on whether a reasonable alternative design was available. The 
second conclusion clearly implicates product category liability.75 Earlier 
we established that American courts have almost universally rejected 
category liability.76 Thus, if a court is employing risk-utility balancing, it 
can only be asking whether a reasonable alternative design should have 
been adopted. 
In any event, under the analysis in Mikolajczyk the reality is that, 
if risk-utility evidence is introduced by either side, the judge will give the 
case to the jury with a risk-utility instruction patterned after comment f.  
The defendant will argue that it correctly chose a cost-effective, 
reasonably safe design, and the plaintiff will insist that a reasonable 
alternative was available that could have avoided or reduced the injury. 
Any plaintiff who shows up in court knowing full well that the defendant 
will introduce risk-utility evidence that supports the product design must 
be ready to counter with evidence that a reasonable alternative was 
available. The burden of proof on risk-utility, according to the Illinois 
court, lies with the plaintiff.77 Reasonable alternative design is not an idea 
conjured up by the Restatement drafters. It lies at the very heart of risk-
utility balancing.78  
B. Liability Without Rhetoric: The Missouri Experience 
Missouri is an interesting example of a state that, while 
disavowing reliance on the Products Liability Restatement, nevertheless 
requires plaintiffs to establish a reasonable alternative design in order to 
make out a prima facie case of design defect. In a series of cases, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri has specifically rejected the consumer 
expectations test,79 risk-utility balancing,80 and the Restatement test 
requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design.81 Instead, a jury is to 
be instructed only that liability for defective product design depends on a 
finding that the product is unreasonably dangerous.82 Yet, both state and 
federal court decisions in Missouri uphold jury verdicts whenever the 
  
 74  See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 9, § 8.5. 
 75 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 76 See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.  
 77 Blue v. Envtl. Eng’g, Inc., 828 N.E.2d 1128, 1142-43 (Ill. 2005).  
 78 OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 9, §§ 8.4-8.5. 
 79 Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc. 707 S.W.2d 371, 377-78 (Mo. 1986) (en 
banc) (rejecting consumer expectations test for jury instructions). 
 80 Newman v. Ford Motor Co., 975 S.W.2d 147, 152-54 (Mo. 1998) (en banc) (rejecting 
risk-utility balancing for jury instructions). 
 81 Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 996 S.W.2d 47, 64-65 (Mo. 1999) (en banc) 
(rejecting reasonable alternative design in favor of “unreasonably dangerous” instruction).  
 82 Id. at 65.  
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plaintiff proves a reasonable alternative design,83 reverse summary 
judgments in favor of defendants whenever plaintiffs proffer credible 
evidence of a reasonable alternative design,84 and grant summary 
judgment for defendants whenever plaintiffs fail to produce credible 
evidence of a reasonable alternative design.85  
Often the grant of summary judgment in Missouri is predicated 
on the failure of plaintiff’s expert to meet Daubert criteria.86 This is odd 
on the face of it—if it is not necessary to prove a reasonable alternative 
design, why should an expert’s opinion on the feasibility of an alternative 
design be necessary? If a plaintiff can establish a case merely by 
asserting that the product is unreasonably dangerous, why should a jury 
not be permitted to decide that issue sans expert testimony on the 
  
 83 Bass v. Gen. Motors Corp., 150 F.3d 842, 844-45, 851 (8th Cir. 1998) (court affirmed 
jury verdict in favor of plaintiff who claimed that his head hit the car window during a collision 
because the seat belt mechanism was defectively designed in that it allowed too much slack to 
develop; a design that would have created more tension between the belt and the body of the plaintiff 
would have averted plaintiff’s head injuries); Peters v. Gen. Motors Corp., 200 S.W.3d 1, 17-20 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (jury verdict in favor of plaintiff claiming design defect in the cruise-control 
mechanism of a 1993 Oldsmobile that caused the car to go out of control upheld; plaintiff introduced 
sufficient expert testimony of alternative design of the cruise-control mechanism that would have 
avoided the accident); Redfield v. Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc., 42 S.W.3d 703, 710 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2001) (court upheld jury verdict in favor of plaintiff’s decedent against the manufacturer of 
a ventilator that failed causing death to plaintiff; plaintiff introduced evidence that the ventilator was 
unreasonably dangerous because it did not have a redundant backup breathing system).  
 84 Pritchett v. Cottrell, Inc., 512 F.3d 1057 (8th Cir. 2008) (court reversed summary 
judgment for defendant on claims of plaintiff truck drivers that the ratchet system used to tie down 
new automobiles on transport trailers was defective and caused them serious injuries; though under 
both Missouri and Kansas law [whose laws applied to the respective plaintiffs] plaintiff is not 
required to prove a reasonable alternative design, the plaintiffs’ expert opinion set forth several 
practical alternative designs for ratchet mechanisms that were safer and would have avoided the 
plaintiffs’ injuries); Sappington v. Skyjack, Inc., 512 F.3d 440 (8th Cir. 2007) (after noting that 
Missouri does not require testimony of a reasonable alternative design, the court reversed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant on claim that a “scissors lift” should have been 
designed with greater stability so that it would not tip over when the rear wheels dropped off a 
concrete floor into the hold; plaintiff’s case met Daubert standards because there was evidence that 
at the time the product was manufactured the technology existed to produce a more stable lift that 
would have avoided the plaintiff’s death); Anderson v. F.J. Little Mach. Co., 68 F.3d 1113 (8th Cir. 
1995) (court reversed trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant where plaintiff 
suffered injuries when his hand was caught while trying to wipe the rollers clean when a metal 
straightening machine was running because plaintiff’s expert had testified in a deposition that the 
machine could have been equipped with an interlock barrier guard which would have prevented the 
unsafe cleaning of the rollers of the machine while it was in operation).  
 85 Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., 173 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir. 1999) (court upheld grant of 
summary judgment for defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff’s expert’s suggested alternative 
design of an “awareness barrier” to the corn head of a combine did not meet Daubert reliability 
criteria; plaintiff was injured when he got swept into the combine by feeding the combine from the 
front though he was warned never to do so); Shaffer v. Amada Am. Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D. 
Mo. 2003) (defendant granted summary judgment against plaintiff’s claim that a press brake 
machine was defectively designed causing plaintiff to lose multiple fingers when his hand got caught 
between the lower ram of the machine and the upper die; plaintiff’s expert’s proffered alternative 
design did not meet Daubert criteria and was inadmissible); Pillow v. Gen. Motors Corp., 184 
F.R.D. 304 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (defendant granted summary judgment against plaintiff’s design defect 
claim that GM van, on impact with another vehicle, transmitted forces to the braking system, causing 
the brake pedal to violently thrust rearward; plaintiff’s expert’s alternative design failed to meet 
Daubert criteria and was inadmissible).  
 86 See supra note 85.  
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feasibility of the proposed alternative design? Where the jurisprudence of 
a state seeks to escape the conundrum of any theoretical structure, yet the 
cases are replete with discussions of a reasonable alternative design as 
the criterion for the validity of the cause of action, the lesson is clear. 
Courts, with or without a theoretical structure for defective design, focus 
on reasonable alternative design as the crucial element in deciding the 
bona fides of a design defect case.87  
C. Reasonable Alternative Design Is the Strong Majority Rule for 
Classic Design Defect Cases 
Having staked out the position that, notwithstanding confusing 
rhetoric, plaintiffs do not reach juries in classic design defect cases 
without offering evidence of a reasonable alternative design, we now 
turn our attention to those states that have clearly adopted the view that a 
reasonable alternative design is necessary to establish a prima facie case 
of design defect. Given how deeply entrenched section 402A is in the 
case law, we are gratified to see the large number of courts that have said 
that plaintiff must present proof of a reasonable or feasible alternative 
design. Some have done so by legislative mandate, but the large majority 
has done so by judicial decision. Some critics have sought to 
delegitimize statutory provisions that require proof of a reasonable 
alternative design as nothing more than reactionary “tort reform” 
accomplished at the bidding of business interests.88 However, when 
legislation is balanced, backed by the overwhelming body of American 
scholars89 and part of a growing body of case law that is supportive, 
pejorative name-calling rings hollow. Thus, the five states that by statute 
  
 87 Pritchett, 512 F.3d at 1063, 1066 (plaintiff was not required to prove a reasonable 
alternative design though Court reversed summary judgment for defendant on grounds that there 
were several practical and safer alternative designs for ratchet mechanism); Skyjack, 512 F.3d at 443, 
446-48 (plaintiff’s testimony of a reasonable alternative design was not required though Court 
reversed summary judgment for defendant on grounds that there was a reasonable alternative design 
available for “scissors lift”). In two Missouri Appellate Court decisions, the courts did not require 
the plaintiffs to prove a reasonable alternative design but gave heavy credence to the availability of a 
reasonable alternative design. See Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 275 S.W.3d 748 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (court upheld jury verdict for plaintiff on grounds that Kool Menthol cigarettes 
were unreasonably dangerous; plaintiff was not required to prove a reasonable alternative design 
though the court concluded that evidence demonstrated that specific design choices by defendant had 
the potential to affect plaintiff’s health during the time period she smoked); Thompson v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 207 S.W.3d 76, 95-96 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (court found that plaintiff 
did not have to prove a reasonable alternative design and held that the evidence went beyond a 
categorical attack on cigarettes; there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the 
products were unreasonably dangerous as designed since plaintiff had submitted proof that tobacco 
companies made specific design choices that had the potential to affect plaintiff’s health during the 
time period he smoked).  
 88 See, e.g., Larry S. Stewart, Reaffirming Strict Liability for Product Design Cases, 
TRIAL MAG., Nov. 2008, at 11 n.15. This theme has been repeated on numerous occasions at 
symposia and seminars.  
 89 See supra note 33.  
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require proof of a reasonable alternative design—Louisiana,90 
Mississippi,91 New Jersey,92 North Carolina,93 and Texas94—represent 
one-fifth of the twenty five states that we count in support of the 
Products Liability Restatement’s position. 
We shall not burden the reader with a state-by-state discussion of 
the decisions in the twenty jurisdictions whose common law decisions 
support the proposition that a reasonable alternative design is necessary 
in a classic design defect case. The notes in the margin will have to bear 
the weight of accomplishing that task. We note the following 
jurisdictions that support the thesis: Alabama,95 Delaware,96 District of 
  
 90 LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.56 (West 1998) (The statute provides that “[a] product is 
unreasonably dangerous if, at the time the product left its manufacturer’s control: (1) There existed 
an alternative design for the product that was capable of preventing the claimant’s damage.”). Under 
Louisiana’s statute, failure to make out the statutory elements will result in a grant of summary 
judgment for the defendant. Id.; see, e.g., Morgan v. Gaylord Container Corp., 30 F.3d 586, 590 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (plaintiff was injured when an allegedly defective pump leaked water causing her to slip 
and fall; summary judgment granted because plaintiff’s experts did not testify that an alternative 
design existed when the product left the defendant’s control and did not testify as to the effect of the 
suggested alternative design on the utility of the pump).  
 91 MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-1-63(a), (f) (2008). To make out a prima facie case for design 
defect, a plaintiff must prove that a reasonable alternative design was available. Failure to proffer a 
credible reasonable alternative design will result in summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 
See, e.g., Johnson v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 544, 549-50, 552 (N.D. Miss. 2005), 
aff’d, 193 Fed. App’x. 349 (5th Cir. 2006) (claimant asserted that a stepladder suffered from design 
defect that caused the claimant’s accident, resulting in injury; court granted summary judgment to 
defendant when plaintiff “offered no evidence relative to the effectiveness of the alternative design 
in reducing the severity or frequency of accidents”); Clark v. Brass Eagle, Inc., 866 So. 2d 456, 461 
(Miss. 2004) (plaintiff hit in the eye in a paintball game alleged defective design against the paintball 
gun manufacturer; summary judgment granted to defendant when plaintiff did not introduce 
evidence of feasible alternative design).  
 92 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58c-3 (West 2000); see, e.g., Cavanaugh v. Skil Corp., 751 A.2d 
518, 521 (N.J. 2000) (court compared New Jersey statute, which puts the burden on the defendant to 
prove there was a lack of feasible alternative design for a defense, and section 2(b) of Products 
Liability Restatement, which puts the burden of proof on the plaintiff). The Cavanaugh court 
concluded that “[t]he plaintiff, under New Jersey law, is usually required to show the existence of a 
reasonable alternative design. But where the defendant shows that there exists no design alternative 
which was practical and technically feasible, the jury need not weigh the plaintiff’s proposed design 
against the defendant’s.” Id.  
 93 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99B-6 (West 2000); see, e.g., Dewitt v. Eveready Battery 
Co., 550 S.E.2d 511, 518-19 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001), aff’d, 565 S.E.2d 140 (N.C. 2002) (court upheld 
summary judgment for defendant when plaintiff proffered an alternative design to batteries that had 
leaked onto his skin and caused alkaline burns, when the court did not find that the alternative design 
was practical, safer, or likely to have prevented the harm to the plaintiff).  
 94 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.005 (Vernon 2005). Texas courts have 
demanded that evidence of a proffered safer alternative be backed by expert testimony that evaluates 
the economic feasibility of the alternative design and the correlative risks that the alternative design 
presents to the user. See, e.g., Smith v. Louisville Ladder Co., 237 F.3d 515, 518-20 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(applying Texas law) (court reversed jury verdict for plaintiff because plaintiff’s expert never 
evaluated the risks of the proposed alternative design); Smith v. Aqua-Flo, Inc., 23 S.W.3d 473, 478 
(Tex. App. 2000) (plaintiff must establish not only technical feasibility but also economic feasibility 
of a safer alternative design; court upheld directed verdict in favor of manufacturer).  
 95 Alabama unequivocally requires proof of a reasonable alternative design in design 
defect cases. Summary judgment has been granted for defendant in numerous cases where this 
requirement is not met. The leading case is General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176 (Ala. 
1985), stating that:  
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In order to prove defectiveness, the plaintiff must prove that a safer, practical, alternative 
design was available to the manufacturer at the time it manufactured the automobile. The 
existence of a safer, practical, alternative design must be proved by showing that: (a) The 
plaintiff’s injuries would have been eliminated or in some way reduced by use of the 
alternative design, and that; (b) taking into consideration such factors as the intended use 
of the vehicle, its styling, cost, and desirability, its safety aspects, the foreseeability of the 
particular accident, the likelihood of injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury if 
that accident occurred, the obviousness of the defect, and the manufacturer’s ability to 
eliminate the defect, the utility of the alternative design outweighed the utility of the 
design actually used. 
Id. at 1191. This rule has been consistently applied in the Alabama courts. See Townsend v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 642 So. 2d 411, 423 (Ala. 1994) (summary judgment granted for defendants as 
plaintiff’s expert testimony did not establish viability of an alternative design of a compaction unit 
on a garbage truck); Beech v. Outboard Marine Corp., 584 So. 2d 447, 450 (Ala. 1991) (In 
answering a question certified by the United States District Court, the Alabama Supreme Court held 
that failure to prove that a “safer, practical, alternative design was available” was a bar to a cause of 
action for defective design under both the Alabama Extended Manufacturer Liability Doctrine 
(AEMLD) and negligence.). Cases decided after the adoption of the Products Liability Restatement 
continue to require proof of a reasonable alternative design to make out a prima facie case under 
AEMLD. See, e.g., Flemister v. Gen. Motors Corp., 723 So. 2d 25, 27-28 (Ala. 1998) (“APJI 
[Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions] requires a jury to determine, using a risk/utility balancing 
process, whether a plaintiff alleging a lack of crashworthiness has shown that a safer, practical 
alternative design existed that would have eliminated or reduced the plaintiff’s injuries if it had been 
used.”). 
 96 Allen v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. Civ.A. 94-264 JJF, 1997 WL 34501372, at *1 
(D. Del. Dec. 18, 1997). In granting summary judgment for defendant-manufacturer of computer 
keyboards when there was no evidence that the plaintiff’s proffered alternative design of a computer 
keyboard would prevent or lessen carpal tunnel syndrome, the Court concluded that “a product is 
defective in design where it is not reasonably fit for its intended purpose and where the design has 
created a risk of harm which is so probable that an ordinary prudent person, acting as the product’s 
manufacturer, would pursue a different available design to substantially lessen the probability of 
harm.” Id. at *45 (emphasis added); Nacci v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 325 A.2d 617, 620 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1974) (“[T]he proper test is whether the design has created a risk of harm which is so 
probable that an ordinarily prudent person, acting as a manufacturer, would pursue a different 
available design which would substantially lessen the probability of harm.”) (emphasis added). 
 97 In Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272 (D.C. 1995), the court 
stated that to establish design defect, “[i]n general, the plaintiff must ‘show the risks, costs and 
benefits of the product in question and alternative designs[,’] and ‘that the magnitude of the danger 
from the product outweighed the costs of avoiding the danger.’” Id. at 1276 (citing Hull v. Eaton 
Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 453-54 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); accord Artis v. Corona Corp. of Japan, 703 A.2d 
1214, 1215 (D.C. 1997). 
 98 In Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga. 1994), the court adopted 
risk-utility balancing as the governing test for design litigation, stating:  
[T]he reasonableness of choosing from among various alternative product designs and 
adopting the safest one if it is feasible is considered the “heart” of design defect cases, 
since it is only at their most extreme that design defect cases reflect the position that a 
product is simply so dangerous that it should not have been made available at all. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The position adopted by the Georgia high court recognizes 
that, except for the “most extreme” instance, when a court determines that the product is so 
dangerous that it should not have been sold at all, it is necessary to prove a reasonable alternative 
design. See id. This position is supported by section 2(b) and comment e thereto. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) & cmt. e (1998). 
 99 Although section 34-20-4-1 of the Indiana Code adopts the consumer expectation test, 
the Code specifically provides that, for liability to attach in cases where there is an alleged design 
defect or failure to warn, “the party making the claim must establish that the manufacturer or seller 
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failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in designing the product or in providing 
the warnings or instructions.” IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-2-2 (LexisNexis 2008). Even prior to 1998, 
when the express requirement that negligence is the governing rule in design defect and failure to 
warn cases took effect, Indiana case law required proof of a reasonable alternative design to make 
out a case for defective design. See, e.g., Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E.2d 1207, 1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1989) (court held that a “burden of proof scheme” required that “plaintiff must prove that a feasible 
safer alternative product design existed”); see also Whitted v. Gen. Motors Corp., 58 F.3d 1200, 
1206 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying Indiana law) (Although Indiana statute sets forth a consumer 
expectation test, “[t]o allege that a manufacturer breached its duty to design a safe product under 
strict liability, a claimant must offer a safer, more practicable product design than the design in 
question. Accordingly, since [plaintiff] failed to present evidence that the product was flawed in its 
design and he failed to illustrate that a better design was cost-effective, summary judgment was 
properly issued as to the claim of design defect.”) (citation omitted); Pries v. Honda Motor Co., 31 
F.3d 543, 545 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Indiana law) (in crashworthiness case where issue was 
safety of automobile design, court cited to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
§ 2(b) & cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994) and said “[t]o demonstrate a defect, the plaintiff must 
compare the costs and benefits of alternative designs”); Miller v. Todd, 551 N.E.2d 1139, 1141-42 
(Ind. 1990) (applying risk-utility analysis); Rogers v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 557 N.E.2d 1045, 
1051 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 745 N.E.2d 793 (Ind. 2001) (“A 
defective design is one which makes the product inadequate or unsafe relative to alternate design 
choices.”).  
 100 See, e.g., Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 169, 181-82 (Iowa 2002) 
(Court adopted sections 1 and 2 of the Products Liability Restatement; Restatement design standards 
under section 2(b) apply whether the claim is brought under negligence, strict liability or the implied 
warranty of merchantability).  
 101 In Toyota Motor Corp. v. Gregory, 136 S.W.3d 35, 42 (Ky. 2004), the Kentucky 
Supreme Court reviewed a set of early design defect cases, such as Jones v. Hutchinson 
Manufacturing, Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1973), and Ingersoll-Rand Company v. Rice, 775 S.W.2d 
924 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988). The court, citing to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 
2 cmt. d (1998), said Kentucky law “stands for the proposition that design defect liability requires 
proof of a feasible alternative design.” Toyota Motor Corp., 136 S.W.3d at 42. Applying that 
principle to the case at bar, the court said:  
[t]he elements of a prima facie crashworthiness claim are: (1) an alternative safer design, 
practical under the circumstances; (2) proof of what injuries, if any, would have resulted 
had the alternative, safer design been used; and (3) some method of establishing the 
extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design. 
Id. at 41; see also Burke v. U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 930, 933 (W.D. Ky. 2007) (“In the 
typical design defect claim Kentucky law requires proof of a feasible alternative design.” 
Defendant’s motion for judgment n.o.v. denied because plaintiffs “met the requirement of showing a 
feasible alternative.”); Fritz v. Campell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Co., No. 05-360-JBC, 2007 WL 
1558509, at *1, *3-4 (E.D. Ky. May 29, 2007), aff’d, 279 Fed. App’x. 333 (6th Cir. 2008) (summary 
judgment granted to manufacturer of pressure washer; the design alternatives introduced by plaintiff 
supported the technological feasibility of the alternative design but did not address many factors 
necessary to determine the issue of whether the product that caused the injury was unreasonably 
dangerous); Estate of Bigham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 462 F. Supp. 2d 766, 779 (E.D. Ky. 2006) 
(summary judgment granted to defendant in crashworthiness case because of plaintiff’s failure to 
establish a reasonable alternative design); Caudill v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. Civ.A. 04-333-DLB, 
2005 WL 3149311, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 23, 2005) (summary judgment granted to defendant in 
crashworthiness case; plaintiff failed to introduce “competent evidence[] that a feasible, alternative, 
safer design existed”). 
 102 See St. Germain v. Husqvarna Corp., 544 A.2d 1283, 1285 (Me. 1988) (court rejected 
consumer expectations test and adopted risk-utility balancing as the standard for determining 
defective design). The St. Germain court concluded, “In actions based upon defects in design, 
negligence and strict liability theories overlap in that under both theories the plaintiff must prove that 
the product was defectively designed thereby exposing the user to an unreasonable risk of harm. 
Such proof will involve an examination of the utility of its design, the risk of the design and the 
feasibility of safer alternatives.” Id. (quoting Stanley v. Schiari Mobile Homes, 462 A.2d 1144, 1148 
(Me. 1983)). At least one federal court has held that Maine requires proof of a reasonable alternative 
design. See Reali v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 75, 80-81 (D. Me. 2000) (“[I]n 
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Maine, a plaintiff in a design defect case must prove that an alternative design is feasible and 
safer.”). In Reali, the plaintiff could not demonstrate that a safer alternative automobile seat exists 
and court granted summary judgment to defendant. See id. But see Phillips v. Emerson Elec. Co., 
No. 02-179-PC, 2003 WL 21011349, at *3 (D. Me. May 5, 2003), aff’d, No. Civ. 02-179-P-C, 2003 
WL 21276388 (D. Me. May 29, 2003) (proof of reasonable alternative design to make out a prima 
facie case was reasonable interpretation of Maine case law but not necessarily mandatory).  
 103 In an early case based on a negligence theory, Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 
1188 (Mass. 1978), the court held that there is “a case for the jury if the plaintiff can show an 
available design modification which would reduce the risk without undue cost or interference with 
the performance of the machinery.” Id. at 1193. In a case decided the same year, Back v. Wickes 
Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964 (Mass. 1978), the court held that Massachusetts law of warranty was 
“congruent in nearly all respects with the principles expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
402A (1965),” id. at 969, and went on to hold that in a design case it would put heavy emphasis on 
the “mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved design, 
and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result from an 
alternative design.” Id. at 970 (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978)). Some 
twelve years later in Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated, 505 
U.S. 1215 (1992), on the issue of federal preemption in the field of cigarette labeling, the court 
discussed requirements of proof in a design defect case and said,  
[w]e are aware of no Massachusetts case in which liability attached in the absence of 
evidence that some different, arguably safer, alternative design was possible. In a design 
defect case premised on negligence, the existence of a safer alternative design is a sine 
qua non for the imposition of liability. . . . It follows, we think, that a design defect case 
premised on breach of warranty is, in Massachusetts, similarly dependent on proof of the 
existence of a safer alternative design—a design which reasonably could, or should, have 
been adopted.  
Id. at 1225 (citations omitted). A similar view is expressed in Johnson v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 194, 207 (D. Mass 2000) (applying Massachusetts law) (“In the 
tobacco context, as with design defect cases premised on negligence, a plaintiff alleging breach of 
warranty based on design defect must first plead that the tobacco in the cigarettes consumed was 
itself defective, and then offer proof of a safer alternative design which could reasonably have been 
adopted.”) (citation omitted); see also O’Neil v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., No. 06-10433-DPW, 
2008 WL 2066948, at *7 (D. Mass. May 14, 2008) (breach of implied warranty claim against 
lawnmower manufacturer survived motion for summary judgment because plaintiff introduced 
credible evidence of safer alternative design that would have prevented the injury); Alves v. Mazda 
Motor of Am., Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 285, 298-99 (D. Mass. 2006) (applying Massachusetts law) 
(claim that defectively designed airbag caused plaintiff’s blindness dismissed on summary 
judgment). In Alves, the court found that the plaintiff’s experts did not meet Daubert criteria but 
explained that even if the expert testimony had been admissible, claims of implied warranty and 
negligence would be dismissed since the experts offered “no evidence on the mechanical feasibility 
of any alternative design, the costs of such a design or the consequences of such a design.” 
Id. at 299. 
 104 Michigan has explicitly rejected the consumer expectations test as the general standard 
for defective design and has adopted a pure risk-utility analysis for design defect cases, regardless of 
whether the case was based on strict liability (or implied warranty of merchantability) or negligence. 
See Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1984). As a practical matter, the plaintiff 
cannot establish a prima facie case of design defect without producing evidence of a reasonable 
alternative design. In Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. 1982), the failure of 
the plaintiff to produce evidence of the practicality and cost-effectiveness of a proffered alternative 
design was grounds for upholding a directed verdict for the defendant. Id. at 378-79; accord Scott v. 
Allen Bradley Co., 362 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (“Owens established that the 
plaintiff must present evidence concerning the magnitude of the risks involved and the 
reasonableness of any proposed alternative design.”). The Michigan Court of Appeals in Reeves v. 
Cincinnati, Inc., 439 N.W.2d 326 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), summarized the elements of a prima facie 
case of failure to provide adequate safety devices: 
[A] prima facie case of a design defect premised upon the omission of a safety device 
requires first a showing of the magnitude of foreseeable risks, including the likelihood of 
occurrence of the type of accident precipitating the need for the safety device and the 
severity of the injuries sustainable from such an accident. It secondly requires a showing 
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of alternative safety devices and whether those devices would have been effective as a 
reasonable means of minimizing the foreseeable risk of danger. This latter showing may 
entail an evaluation of the alternative design in terms of its additional utility as a safety 
measure and its trade-offs against the costs and effective use of the product.  
Id. at 329 (emphasis added); see also Phillips v. Hardware Wholesalers, Inc., 762 F.2d 46, 47-48 
(6th Cir. 1985) (applying Michigan law); Foster v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 714 F.2d 654, 657 (6th 
Cir. 1983) (applying Michigan law); Gawenda v. Werner Co., 932 F. Supp. 183, 187-88 (E.D. Mich. 
1996) (applying Michigan law), aff’d, 127 F.3d 1102 (6th Cir. 1997); Zettle v. Handy Mfg. Co., 837 
F. Supp. 222, 225 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (applying Michigan law), aff’d, 998 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1993). 
More recent cases continue to articulate the requirement that to make out a prima facie case of 
design defect, plaintiff must present evidence of reasonable alternative design. See, e.g., Witbeck v. 
Checkmate Boats, Inc., No. 275934, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1473, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. July 17, 
2008); Strauch v. Raymond Corp., No. 254224, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 3297, at *4 (Mich. Ct. 
App. Dec. 29, 2005); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Carrier Corp., No. 235567, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 
456, at *8 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2003); Cacevic v. Simplimatic Eng’g Co., 645 N.W.2d. 287, 293 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2001); Bazinau v. Mackinac Island Carriage Tours, 593 N.W.2d 219, 226 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1999). 
 105 In Holm v. Sponco Manufacturing, Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 212-13 (Minn. 1982), the 
Minnesota court rejected the consumer expectations test and adopted risk-utility balancing as the 
governing rule for design defect litigation. Minnesota recognizes that, in general, the plaintiff has the 
burden of showing a reasonable, safer alternative design, but notes that there may be rare cases in 
which that requirement does not apply. Thus, in Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 
1987), the court stated that, in establishing that a product was unreasonably dangerous, “a factor 
bearing upon the . . . requirement will be the existence or nonexistence of a feasible alternative 
design. . . . [T]he plaintiff ordinarily has the burden of showing the existence of an alternative design 
that was safer.” Id. at 96 (emphasis added). Amplifying this point in a lengthy footnote, the court 
said,  
Examination of our cases . . . alleg[ing] defective design demonstrates that, as a practical 
matter, successful plaintiffs, almost without fail, introduce evidence of an alternative 
safer design. See, e.g., Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, (Minn. 1984) (plaintiff 
presented evidence of manufacturer’s actual alternative design of dockboard); Hudson v. 
Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 1982) (plaintiff presented evidence that a 
portion of the release mechanism of a hydraulic bed dumptruck was superfluously long 
creating the defect); Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977) 
(plaintiff presented evidence that a turn signal’s use of a plastic yoke inside a lock 
steering column required a design allowing a greater clearance radius than the 
manufacturer’s design had allowed); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 
N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1967) (plaintiff presented evidence that the cover of a vaporizer 
should have been secured such that it would prevent water in the vaporizer’s jar from 
simultaneously discharging if the vaporizer should tip over).  
Id. at 96 n.6 (emphasis omitted). 
  The Minnesota high court in Kallio did not require that in all cases a reasonable 
alternative design be presented to the jury as an essential element in finding a defect. The court said 
that “[a]lthough normally evidence of a safer alternative design will be presented initially by the 
plaintiff, it is not necessarily required in all cases.” Id. at 96-97 (emphasis added). The court 
exemplified this exception by citing Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978), 
stating that “[c]onceivably, rare cases may exist where the product may be judged unreasonably 
dangerous because it should be removed from the market rather than be redesigned.” Kallio, 407 
N.W.2d at 97 n.8. 
  A fair reading of Minnesota law is that for the majority of design defect cases, proof of 
a reasonable alternative is necessary. It is not, however, necessary to instruct a jury on a reasonable 
alternative design requirement, though a general instruction on risk-utility is required by the court. In 
rare cases, when a product involves negligible utility and high risk, the reasonable alternative design 
requirement is not imposed. The position of the Minnesota courts is thus fully consistent with both 
the black letter of section 2 and comments d, e, and f. A leading authority on Minnesota products 
liability law agrees. See generally Mike Steenson, A Comparative Analysis of Minnesota Products 
Liability Law and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1 
(1998). 
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  Cases decided post-adoption of the Products Liability Restatement are in accord. See, 
e.g., Wagner v. Hesston Corp., 450 F.3d 756, 760 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying Minnesota law) (court 
noted that to satisfy the requirement that a product be unreasonably dangerous, “the plaintiff 
ordinarily has the burden of showing the existence of an alternative design that was safer” (quoting 
Kallio, 407 N.W.2d at 96)). The court upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment because 
plaintiff’s suggested alternative design did not meet Daubert standards. See id. at 761; Young v. 
Pollock Eng’g Group, Inc., 428 F.3d 786, 789 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying Minnesota law). “Only in 
rare cases do defective-design claims succeed without showing a safer design. ‘Conceivably, rare 
cases may exist where the product may be judged unreasonably dangerous because it should be 
removed from the market rather than be redesigned.’” Young, 428 F.3d at 791 (citation omitted). The 
Young court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant because there was 
ample evidence of a reasonable alternative design. Id. at 791; see also Solo v. Trus Joist MacMillan, 
No. Civ. 02-2955 (RHK/RLE), 2004 WL 524898, at *11-12 (D. Minn. Mar. 15, 2004) (plaintiff 
failed to provide evidence of a feasible alternative safer design for a furnace as required by 
Minnesota law; defendant entitled to summary judgment); Bruzer v. Danek Med., Inc., No. Civ. 3-
95-971/RHKJMM, 1999 WL 613329, at *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 8, 1999) (applying Minnesota law) 
(defendant entitled to summary judgment on claim that medical device was defectively designed 
because plaintiff failed to provide evidence of reasonable alternative design and product was not one 
of rare cases where product should not have been marketed at all). 
 106 Montana courts have few decisions dealing with the issue of the standard for design 
defect. However, the few cases extant support the proposition that to maintain a claim of design 
defect a plaintiff must prove that a reasonable alternative design could have been adopted that would 
have reduced the harm. In Rix v. General Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195 (Mont. 1986), the court said 
that “a design is defective if at the time of manufacture an alternative designed product would have 
been safer than the original designed product and was both technologically feasible and a marketable 
reality.” Id. at 202. Earlier in the decision, the court emphasized that this rule applied when “a 
manufactured product is claimed to be unreasonably dangerous because a safer alternative was 
available to the manufacturer.” Id. The court left open the question of how it would rule if no 
alternative design was technologically feasible. Id. at 201 (citing O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 
298, 306 (N.J. 1983), superseded in part by statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58c-3 (West 2000), as 
recognized in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990), in which the court 
held that a design could be found to be defective even if no feasible alternative was available). Even 
if the Montana court were to follow O’Brien, in the ordinary design defect case, a reasonable 
alternative design would have to be proven; O’Brien, on its own terms, allows for dispensing with 
the alternative design requirement only when the product has minimal social utility. See id. (Some 
products “are so dangerous and of such little use that under the risk-utility analysis, a manufacturer 
would bear the cost of liability of harm to others.”); see also Preston v. Mont. Eighteenth Judicial 
Dist. Court, 936 P.2d 814, 820 (Mont. 1997) (“[E]vidence of alternative designs available prior to 
the manufacture of the N12 [model pneumatic roofing nailer] is not only relevant, but necessary, to 
[plaintiff’s] products liability claim and, therefore, the District Court is clearly proceeding under a 
mistake of law in precluding discovery of alternative design evidence . . . .”); Krueger v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 783 P.2d 1340, 1345 (Mont. 1989) (court reiterated the need for a reasonable 
alternative design). 
 107 The leading case in New Mexico is Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54 (N.M. 
1995). Brooks attributes time-of-trial knowledge to defendant, but, given that knowledge, applies a 
risk-utility test to the issue of design defect. In Brooks, the New Mexico high court stated that it 
would charge a manufacturer with time-of-trial knowledge of risk regardless of whether it was 
available to defendant at time of sale. Nonetheless, the court clearly adopted a risk-utility analysis as 
the grounds for deciding whether a product was unreasonably dangerous. Id. at 61-62. It should be 
noted that the court said: 
Under the current product liability jury instructions, SCRA 1986, 13-1401 to 13-
1433 (Repl.Pamp.1991), the jury is instructed that a supplier’s liability is measured by 
“an unreasonable risk of injury resulting from a condition of the product or from a 
manner of its use.” UJI 13-1406. As to either flaw or design, the jury is informed that 
“[a]n unreasonable risk of injury is a risk which a reasonably prudent person having full 
knowledge of the risk would find unacceptable.” UJI 13-1407. Lastly, the jury is 
instructed specifically that in determining whether a product design poses an 
unreasonable risk of injury, “[y]ou should consider the ability to eliminate the risk 
without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making it unduly expensive.” 
Id. By requiring the jury to make a risk-benefit calculation, these instructions adequately 
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define “defect” so as to focus jury attention on evidence reflecting meritorious choices 
made by the manufacturer on alternative design and so as to minimize the risk that the 
public will be deprived needlessly of beneficial products for the sake of compensating 
injured victims. 
. . . .  
. . . As observed above, our existing uniform jury instructions allow proof and 
argument on all of the factors suggested by the Restatement (Third) of Torts as relevant 
in determining whether the omission of a reasonable alternative gave rise to an 
unreasonable risk of injury. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2, cmt. 
d, at 19-20 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994); Duran, 101 N.M. at 747, 688 P.2d at 784. The 
distinction between the negligence approach proposed by the Restatement and strict 
liability is the time frame in which the risk-benefit calculation is made.  
Id. at 61-63. The court then concluded,  
If in some future case we are confronted directly with a proffer of evidence on an 
advancement or change in the state of the art that was neither known nor knowable at the 
time the product was supplied, we may at that time reconsider application of a state-of-
the-art defense to those real circumstances, properly developed under the proffer with 
applicable briefs and argument.  
Id. at 63. Several decisions since Brooks emphasize the need for a reasonable alternative design as 
part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. In Smith v. Bryco Arms, 33 P.3d 638 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001), 
plaintiff sued a gun manufacturer for injuries he suffered when a handgun was negligently 
discharged. The plaintiff alleged that safety features were available that would have indicated to the 
user that the gun was loaded and should not be fired. In reversing the trial court’s grant of summary 
judgment to the defendant, the court said: 
Whether the type of misuse evident in this case was foreseeable, whether the 
existing features of the J-22 are sufficiently safe, and whether it was feasible without 
impairing the utility of the gun or being unduly expensive for Bryco and Jennings to 
incorporate the advocated safety devices and/or warnings into the design of the J-22, are 
all issues for the jury to decide. 
Id. at 650. Most persuasive is the decision of the federal district court in Morales v. E.D. Etnyre & 
Co., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (D. N.M. 2005), in which the Court predicted that the New Mexico 
Supreme Court would adopt RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (THIRD): PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b). The court said: 
Etnyre contends that the Plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie showing to satisfy 
the elements for a design defect case in accordance with the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability. The Court agrees that, if the Supreme Court of New Mexico were 
presented with the precise issue in this case, it would most likely adopt the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts[: Products Liability]. Accordingly, the Court will assume that the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability governs this action and that the 
Restatement (Third) is the controlling law for the Plaintiffs’ claims based on defective 
design. 
Before the ALI issued [sic] considered or issued the Restatement (Third), New 
Mexico had adopted the “risk-utility” test. The Court believes that test required the 
plaintiff to prove the existence of an “alternative design” to determine whether the 
defendant defectively designed a product. Thus, to the extent that a plaintiff could come 
to court and merely criticize a product, the Court believes that the New Mexico law 
required the plaintiff to propose an alternative design. 
Morales, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1283. It should be noted that whether a reasonable alternative design is 
required is an issue separate and apart from the question of whether a manufacturer should be 
charged with the knowledge of a risk-avoidance mechanism that was not known at the time of 
manufacture but was known at the time of trial. As set forth earlier, the New Mexico Supreme Court 
left open the “state of art” question for resolution at a later date. In any event, at the very least, the 
New Mexico court seems to require a reasonable alternative design that could be implemented at the 
time of trial. 
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Rhode Island,108 South Carolina,109 Virginia,110 and West Virginia.111 We 
will, however, comment on the views of three states that we count as 
supportive that deserve special comment. 
  
 108 Although the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has not yet held that a reasonable 
alternative design is required, in an important opinion the high court has cited to the language of 
section 2(b) in reversing a directed verdict on the ground that plaintiff had shown that a reasonable 
alternative design was available. In Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., 733 A.2d 712 (R.I. 1999), 
plaintiff, an employee of New England Ecological Development, Inc., observed that one of the 
conveyor belts was running off track. Plaintiff turned off the machine and climbed onto a catwalk to 
determine if the conveyor belt was obstructed. While plaintiff was standing on the catwalk, someone 
restarted the machine. Somehow, plaintiff lost his balance and thrust his arm into the “nip point” of 
the conveyor system. Buonanno, 733 A.2d at 713. The primary issue on appeal was whether the 
distributors of component parts of the nip points were entitled to summary judgment since they only 
sold the components for a system that was fully integrated at the plant. In a lengthy analysis, the 
court adopted section 5 of the Restatement (Third) Products Liability, which states that the 
manufacturer of a component part is not liable unless the component part “is defective in itself” or 
the seller or distributor of the component “substantially participates in the integration of the 
component into the design of the product.” Id. at 716 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: 
PRODS. LIAB. § 5 (1998)) (emphasis omitted). With regard to one defendant (Colmar), the court 
found that there was evidence that could support a jury finding that the distributor was “substantially 
involved” in the integration of the component into the final product. Id. at 717. With regard to a 
second defendant the court observed:  
[W]e are persuaded that a genuine issue of material fact may exist with respect to 
whether the pulley’s design was defective as a result of [the component manufacturer’s] 
failure to produce a reasonable alternative design that may have reduced or avoided the 
foreseeable risk of harm suffered by Buonanno, which would render the product 
defective “in itself” and “at the time of sale or distribution.” Specifically, the Restatement 
(Third) Torts § 2(b) provides that a product is defective when: 
“the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced 
or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or 
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and 
the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably 
safe.” 
Although this issue was not actually litigated by the parties, the record is clear that 
Buonanno produced evidence that a safer design of the pulley was available. Specifically, 
in his deposition, John Brunaccini, Colmar’s president, testified that [the component part 
maker] manufactured (for other customers on a “made-to-order-basis”), a wing pulley 
that had steel welded around the circumference of the wings, and that it manufactured 
this design at the same time that it manufactured the pulley in question. Brunaccini also 
indicated that there was a design known as a “spiral wing pulley” which had circular 
pieces wound around the pulley that would cover “the whole thing.” Accordingly, we are 
satisfied that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether this was a reasonable 
alternative design within the meaning of the Restatement. If so, the question remains as to 
whether the foreseeable risks of harm posed to plaintiff could have been reduced or 
avoided had the alternative design been available and offered . . . . We recognize that it 
may not have been economically feasible . . . to manufacture a wing pulley with this 
additional guarding for this particular use and such a factor would bear significantly upon 
the reasonableness of this alternative design. These determinations, however, are to be 
determined by a fact finder and are not suitable for summary judgment.  
 
Buonanno, 733 A.2d at 717-18. A fair reading of Buonanno is that Rhode Island has adopted not 
only section 5 of the Restatement, but also section 2(b). The court, in seeking to define whether the 
wing pulley was “defective in itself,” clearly relies on the Restatement definition of design defect.  
 109 An early decision requiring a reasonable alternative design for a design defect is Bragg 
v. Hi-Ranger Inc., 462 S.E.2d 321, 330 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (directed verdict for defendant 
manufacturer because plaintiff failed to introduce evidence of a “feasible design alternative”). Since 
then, several federal courts applying South Carolina law have concluded that proof of a reasonable 
alternative design is mandatory in a design defect case. See, e.g., Cohen v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 
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Nos. 98-1925 & 98-2536, 2000 WL 299459, at *1-*2, *4 (4th Cir. Mar. 23, 2000) (applying South 
Carolina law) (jury found for defendant in a design defect case where plaintiff alleged error in that 
the trial judge instructed the jury that plaintiff had the burden of proving a safer alternative design); 
id. at *4 (“The argument lacks merit, because providing evidence of the existence of an alternative 
safer, feasible design is part of the plaintiff’s products liability case under South Carolina law, and 
hence the instruction was appropriate.”); Campbell v. Gala Indus. Inc., No. Civ.A.6:04-2036-RBH, 
2006 WL 1073796, at *4 (D.S.C. Apr. 20, 2006) (applying South Carolina law) (defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment on claim that centrifugal dryer was defectively designed denied because limit 
switch that would have avoided the hazard was “technologically and financially feasible”); Disher v. 
Synthes (U.S.A.), 371 F. Supp. 2d 764, 767-68, 771 (D.S.C. 2005) (defendant manufacturer of 
titanium humeral nail that fractured after implant granted summary judgment because under South 
Carolina law it is crucial that a plaintiff show that a “‘feasible’ or workable, design alternative exists 
under the circumstances”); Little v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 480, 495 
(D.S.C. 2001) (“[W]hile there is no explicit statement including proof of a safer alternative design as 
an element of a product liability case, clearly South Carolina courts have found that failure to 
provide such proof can doom a case as a matter of law.”).  
 110 While state courts have not articulated a clear test for design defect, several federal 
district court decisions indicate that Virginia would require proof of a reasonable alternative design 
as part of plaintiff’s prima facie case. In Kesler v. Crown Equipment Corp., Civ. A. No. 93-0644-R, 
1994 WL 782904, at *1, *3 (W.D. Va. Jul. 5, 1994), aff’d, 51 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 1995), the federal 
district court granted defendant summary judgment because the plaintiff had failed to provide expert 
testimony that the alternative design was feasible. The court said: 
Even if expert testimony were not required, Kesler’s challenge to the alleged design 
defect misses the mark. Essentially, Kesler contends that it was technically feasible to 
install a guardrail and to use a harness rather than a belt. A feasible design, however is 
not necessarily a desirable design. Suggested alterations must be “not only technically 
feasible but also practicable in terms of cost and the over-all design and operation of the 
product.” Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470, 1479 (10th Cir. 1993) [Allen required 
proof of reasonable alternative design]. Although Kesler’s suggested changes are likely 
practicable in terms of cost, Crown’s manager of product engineering testified that those 
changes were not practicable given the nature of the work stockpicker operators perform 
and the stockpicker’s overall function, design and operation.  
Id. at *3. More recently, in Tunnell v. Ford Motor Co., 385 F. Supp. 2d 582, 583 (W.D. Va. 2005), 
the court held that the trial court’s exclusion of plaintiff’s expert witness as to the alleged 
defectiveness of a Jaguar for its failure to have a battery cutoff device, which would have prevented 
a fire after a collision, was not error and that it was proper to grant the defendant-manufacturer a 
directed verdict. We set forth the court’s analysis at length because it so clearly demonstrates the 
court’s reliance on section 2(b) of the Restatement and its comments as the correct interpretation of 
Virginia law: 
Defectiveness analysis considers whether a product is “unreasonably dangerous for 
ordinary or foreseeable use.” Alevromagiros v. Hechinger Co., 993 F.2d 417, 420 (4th 
Cir. 1993). As discussed in the Memorandum Opinion, this “foreseeable uses” standard 
necessarily requires experts to take a broad view of the product they analyze. Because the 
foreseeable uses of some products are wide-ranging, a product may require multiple-and 
potentially competing-design elements to protect against the various foreseeable uses of 
the product. Precisely because of this fact, one design element protecting against a 
foreseeable use can easily frustrate or even impair the value of another measure 
protecting against a different foreseeable use. For this reason, a product designer may 
argue in its defense that a proposed alternative design actually increases the risk that 
injury will result from a different, but equally foreseeable, use of the product. When such 
an argument is made, a plaintiff’s expert cannot simply make a defectiveness judgment 
based upon only one particular type of accident. Rather, he must analyze whether the 
current design, taken as a whole, reasonably protects against the other injuries that could 
occur due to foreseeable uses. This result is a necessary consequence of the “foreseeable 
use” standard because any other standard would render a designer susceptible to 
inconsistent judgments on defectiveness. In one lawsuit, the designer could be liable for 
failing to include a certain protective device; in another, he could be liable for choosing 
to include it. Here, Ford unquestionably argued that Wallingford’s proposed device 
would impose safety risks rendering the Mustang more dangerous. Because Wallingford 
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Arkansas statutorily embraces the consumer expectations test.112 
However, in Dancy v. Hyster Co.,113 the court held that unless the case is 
  
never addressed the question of whether the vehicle taken as a whole was unreasonably 
dangerous for ordinary or foreseeable uses, his opinion was meaningless on the issue of 
defectiveness.  
Ultimately, the preceding analysis merges with the issue Plaintiff raises in his motion 
regarding the risk-benefit analysis. The risk-benefit analysis is not, as Plaintiff argues, 
some additional technical hurdle that this Court is imposing where none existed before. 
Rather, it is a basic concept imbedded in any defectiveness analysis, requiring that a 
proposed alternative design actually cure a product of its alleged defects. Contrary to 
Plaintiff’s contention, Virginia, along with the Third Restatement of Torts, does require 
evidence from a plaintiff that an alternative design truly provides more benefits than 
risks.  
Although the Third Restatement does not require a plaintiff “to establish with 
particularity the costs and benefits associated with adoption of the suggested alternative 
design” in light of the “inherent limitations on access to relevant data,” it nevertheless 
clearly does contemplate that a plaintiff will produce some affirmative evidence as to the 
risk-benefit analysis. As Plaintiff acknowledges, the Restatement is quite clear on this 
point: 
When evaluating the reasonableness of a design alternative, the overall safety 
of the product must be considered. It is not sufficient that the alternative design 
would have reduced or prevented the harm suffered by the plaintiff if it would 
have introduced into the product other dangers of equal or greater magnitude. 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. f (1997). Plaintiff acknowledges 
that some jurisdictions have interpreted the Third Restatement to require proof than [sic] 
an alternative design has passed a risk-benefit analysis, but he argues that neither the 
Virginia Supreme Court nor the Virginia General Assembly has expressly adopted the 
Third Restatement. Even assuming arguendo that Virginia has rejected express adoption 
of the Third Restatement in its entirety, however, this fact alone does not suggest that 
principles from the Third Restatement are not integrated in Virginia common law. As 
with any area of law, persuasive authority in the form of case law from other jurisdictions 
and restatements is instructive in identifying Virginia common law rules.  
Tunnell, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 584-85 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). 
 111 In Morningstar v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979), 
the Supreme Court of Appeals adopted the standard of reasonable safety, as determined “by what a 
reasonably prudent manufacturer’s standards should have been at the time the product was made.” 
Id. at 683 (emphasis added). This language can only be read to require the production of evidence of 
a reasonable alternative design, to gauge what “should have been.” Indeed, in Church v. Wesson, 385 
S.E.2d 393 (W. Va. 1989), the court upheld a directed verdict for defendant, in a strict liability 
context, on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish feasibility of a proffered alternative 
design. Id. at 396 (“[W]e find that appellant failed to establish a prima facie right of recovery. . . . 
[Witness] suggested that [a certain design] may have been a more appropriate [one but] it was 
undisputed that the [alternative] was not feasible . . . .”). 
  In Garlinger v. Hardee’s Food Systems, Inc., 16 F. App’x 232 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(applying West Virginia law), the court upheld a jury verdict for defendant in a case where plaintiff 
had been burned by coffee served at 180-190 degrees Fahrenheit. The plaintiff argued that the trial 
court had wrongfully excluded expert testimony that coffee served at such a high temperature was 
unreasonably dangerous. In upholding the trial court’s ruling, the court cited to McMahon v. Bunn-
O-Matic, 150 F.3d 651, 658 (7th Cir. 1998), for the proposition that an expert must provide 
testimony comparing the benefit of design changes of serving coffee at 150 degrees Fahrenheit 
against the cost in pleasure reduction to prove a design defect case. Since plaintiff’s expert had not 
made such a comparison, his testimony was inadmissible. Thus since the expert could not provide 
credible evidence of a reasonable alternative design, his testimony was not relevant and could not 
support a finding that coffee served at 180-190 degrees Fahrenheit was unreasonably dangerous. 
 112 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-102(7)(A) (2007).  
 113 127 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 1997).  
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one in which the plaintiff can draw a res ipsa-like inference of defect, the 
plaintiff must prove that a safer alternative design was available. In that 
case plaintiff was injured when a lift-truck overturned, pinning his right 
foot and leading to the amputation of his right leg below the knee. Dancy 
sued the lift-truck manufacturer alleging defective design because the 
truck did not have a cage or guard around the compartment to protect the 
operator from injury. The district court found that the plaintiff’s expert 
testimony as to an alternative design did not meet Daubert criteria.114 
Without credible evidence as to the alternative design the defendant was 
entitled to summary judgment.115 The court said: 
Plaintiff does not contend that the lift truck malfunctioned in any way; he 
contends the lift truck was not designed properly because it lacked a safety 
device. Lay jurors would tend to understand products that do not work; they are 
not likely to possess “common understanding” about how products are 
designed. We cannot expect lay jurors to possess understanding about whether 
the mesh guard envisioned by Dr. Forbes would be capable of withstanding the 
force involved in a fall and be effective in protecting Plaintiff from the injury 
he received . . . . We cannot expect a lay juror to know whether the mesh guard 
itself would cause more injuries than it creates by, for instance, breaking and 
puncturing the lift truck’s operator. Although Dancy does not have the burden 
of proving that his “alternative safer design was available and feasible in terms 
of cost, practicality and technological possibility,” French v. Grove Mfg., Co., 
656 F.2d 295, 297 (8th Cir. 1981), he still has the burden of proving the 
existence of a defect by showing that a safer alternative design actually exists. 
He cannot carry this burden without proving that his proposed design will 
actually work, and we believe the answer to this question is beyond the ken of 
lay jurors.116  
Several other federal court decisions relying on Dancy have granted 
summary judgment because plaintiff failed to proffer credible expert 
testimony as to the availability of a practical safer alternative design.117 In 
a recent case, Freeman v. Caterpillar Industrial, Inc.,118 the court noted 
that although plaintiff is not required to prove the economic feasibility of 
an alternative design as part of her prima facie case, if “defendant comes 
forward with evidence to demonstrate the prohibitive cost, impracticality, 
or technological unfeasibility”119 of the alternative design, the case need 
  
 114 Id. at 651-54.  
 115 Id. at 652-53.  
 116 Id. at 653-54 (emphasis added).  
 117 See, e.g., Anderson v. Raymond Corp., 340 F.3d 520 (8th Cir. 2003) (relying on 
Dancy, the Court held that the plaintiff’s expert did not meet Daubert criteria and absent expert 
testimony on a safer alternative design, the plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case, and 
defendant was therefore entitled to summary judgment); Jones v. Gott Corp., 4:00CV00279 GTE, 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26252, at *4, 6 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 6, 2001) (defendant was granted summary 
judgment against a claim that a plastic container was defectively designed when it did not contain a 
flame arrester, thus allowing gasoline in the container to spray out and burn the plaintiff; plaintiff’s 
expert did not meet Daubert criteria and without that testimony, plaintiff could not meet its burden 
of proving that a safer alternative existed).  
 118 No. 3:02-CV-00039 GTE, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23840 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 28, 2007).  
 119 Id. at *20.  
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not be submitted to a jury “because there is a point at which it must be 
said that the alternative design will not work.”120 Thus, notwithstanding 
that an Arkansas statute embraces the consumer expectations test, the 
courts have required the plaintiff to provide evidence of a workable 
alternative design. And, if a defendant demonstrates that the proffered 
alternative design is not economically feasible, the plaintiff will suffer 
either summary judgment or a directed verdict. Although the Arkansas 
test for design defect does not line up in all its particulars with section 
2(b) of the Products Liability Restatement,121 it is a far cry from a strict 
liability consumer expectations test. Plaintiff is required to proffer a 
technologically feasible, safer alternative design and, even when proven, 
it can be defeated by evidence that it is not economically feasible.  
Utah, also, has a statute that predicates liability on a product 
being “dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by 
the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer, or user of that product in that 
community.”122 Notwithstanding this statutory language, the court in 
Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.123 held that “[t]he statute does not create 
a cause of action” but instead limits the plaintiff’s right to recover to 
cases where the product fails to meet consumer expectations.124 In 
addition, however, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable alternative 
design was available at the time the product was put into commerce.125 
Once again a court has held that consumer expectations language in a 
statute is not determinative. Instead the court, citing to the Products 
Liability Restatement,126 held that to make out a prima facie case for 
design defect, a plaintiff must present credible evidence of a reasonable 
alternative design.127  
Finally, we include New York among the jurisdictions that 
require proof of a reasonable alternative design. The leading case 
espousing this view is Voss v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co.,128 a 
landmark case in New York products liability jurisprudence. Products 
  
 120 Id. at *21. 
 121 Under section 2(b), the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the reasonable 
alternative design is technologically and economically feasible.  
 122 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-702 (2008). 
 123 328 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2003).  
 124 Id. at 1278-79 (“The statute does not create a cause of action. It sets limits on any 
cause of action created by some other source of law. It states that in a products liability suit, a 
product will be regarded as defective only if at the time of sale the product was ‘unreasonably 
dangerous’ . . . .”). 
 125 Id. at 1279 (“The statute . . . imposes a necessary condition for a cause of action. The 
statute does not state what is sufficient for a cause of action. Because Utah does not have another 
statute setting forth the elements of a products liability cause of action, the sufficient conditions for 
such a cause of action must come from the common law . . . . This circuit . . . has interpreted Utah 
law to require that the plaintiff prove the practicability of a safer design.”).  
 126 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998). 
 127 Brown, 328 F.3d at 1279 (describing risk-utility/alternative design test used in Allen v. 
Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470, 1472 (10th Cir. 1993)).  
 128 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983).  
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Liability cognoscenti may counter that in Denny v. Ford Motor Co.,129 
the New York Court of Appeals gave explicit recognition to the 
consumer expectations test as a method for establishing design defect.130 
To be sure, in Denny the court approved a separate instruction based on 
the failure of the product to meet consumer expectations131 because the 
product in question, a small utility vehicle, was marketed for highway 
driving. The court noted that the vehicle was reasonably safe as an “off-
road” vehicle but that, when traveling at normal highway speeds, its 
center of gravity was such that it was prone to roll-over accidents, thus 
disappointing consumer expectations.132 The role of marketing as the 
lynchpin for use of the consumer expectations test was emphasized by 
Judge Guido Calabresi in a subsequent decision, Castro v. QVC Network, 
Inc.133 In that case, defendant advertised a roasting pan on a TV home-
shopping channel as suitable for cooking a twenty-five pound turkey. 
Plaintiff bought the roasting pan and used it to prepare a twenty-five 
pound turkey on Thanksgiving. She was injured when she attempted to 
remove the turkey from the pan. While wearing insulated mittens, she 
gripped the pan’s handles with the first two fingers of each hand. She 
could not use more than two fingers because that was the maximum grip 
allowed by the small size of the handles. As she removed the pan, the 
turkey tipped toward her, spilling hot drippings and fat onto her foot and 
ankle causing second- and third-degree burns.134 The plaintiff had pled 
claims in strict liability in tort (risk-utility) and breach of implied 
warranty of merchantability (consumer expectations). The federal district 
court applying New York law instructed only on the strict tort claim. The 
jury found for the defendant. In reversing for failing to give the 
consumer expectations instruction, Judge Calabresi noted that “in Denny, 
the Court of Appeals pointed out that the fact that a product’s overall 
benefits might outweigh its overall risks does not preclude the possibility 
that consumers may have been misled into using the product in a context 
in which it was dangerously unsafe.”135 If not for the specific 
representation as to its suitability for roasting a twenty-five pound 
turkey, it was a safe roasting pan. However, Judge Calabresi noted: 
But, it was also the case that the pan was advertised as suitable for a particular 
use—cooking a twenty-five pound turkey . . . . The product was, therefore, sold 
as appropriately used for roasting a twenty-five pound turkey. 
In such circumstances, New York law is clear that a general charge on strict 
products liability based on the risk-utility approach does not suffice. The jury 
  
 129 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995).  
 130 Id. at 738.  
 131 Id. at 732-33.  
 132 Id. at 732.  
 133 139 F.3d 114, 118-19 (2d Cir. 1998).  
 134  Id. at 115-16. 
 135 Id. at 118.  
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could have found that the roasting pan’s overall utility for cooking low volume 
foods outweighed the risk of injury when cooking heavier foods, but that the 
product was nonetheless unsafe for the purpose for which it was marketed and 
sold—roasting a twenty-five pound turkey and, as such, was defective under 
the consumer expectations test. That being so, the appellants were entitled to a 
separate breach of warranty charge.136  
In a footnote, Judge Calabresi noted that in both Denny and Castro the 
product had been marketed as suitable for “dual purposes” but, in fact, 
was dangerous for use in one of the modes.137  
Given the explicit representations in Denny and Castro, they 
might be better classified as express warranty claims. But whether 
classified as consumer expectations or express warranty they represent a 
tiny share of New York design defect cases. Once one gets past the few 
instances where explicit representations support the use of the consumer 
expectations test,138 the case law in New York is replete with decisions by 
courts that defendants are entitled to summary judgment because 
plaintiffs failed to introduce credible evidence of a reasonable alternative 
design.139 The constancy and volume of decisions to that effect leave 
little doubt as to the law applicable in New York in classic design cases.  
  
 136 Id. at 119.  
 137 Id. at n.11.  
 138 See supra notes 128, 132 and accompanying text.  
 139 A substantial number of decisions set forth the requirement of a reasonable alternative 
design as a prerequisite for a prima facie case of defective design. See, e.g., Rypkema v. Time Mfg. 
Co., 263 F. Supp. 2d 687, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (summary judgment granted to defendant against 
plaintiff’s claim that aerial lift bucket was defectively designed because under New York law 
“plaintiff is required to prove the existence of a feasible alternative” design; plaintiff’s expert failed 
to show the practical availability of such an alternative design); Crespo v. Chrysler Corp., 75 F. 
Supp. 2d 225, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (court granted defendant’s motion to vacate jury verdict against 
plaintiff’s claim that an airbag was defectively designed, citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PRODS. LIAB. § 2, cmt. f (1998), and held that plaintiff must prove a reasonable alternative design 
that would be safer for all users and it is not sufficient if the alternative design would have preexisted 
the plaintiff’s injury); Deere v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 175 F.R.D. 157, 161-62 (N.D.N.Y. 
1997) (defendant tire company granted summary judgment against plaintiff’s claim that he was 
injured by explosion of defectively designed tire because plaintiff did not establish reasonable 
alternative design as required under New York law); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 
204, 208 (N.Y. 1983) (“The plaintiff . . . is under an obligation to present evidence that the product, 
as designed, was not reasonably safe because there was a substantial likelihood of harm and it was 
feasible to design the product in a safer manner. . . .”); Magadan v. Interlake Packaging Corp., 845 
N.Y.S.2d 443, 445 (App. Div. 2007) (summary judgment for defendant upheld on claim that a book 
stitcher was defectively designed since “plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact as to whether at the 
time the stitcher was manufactured, it was feasible to design it in a safer manner); Felix v. Akzo 
Nobel Coatings, Inc., 692 N.Y.S.2d 413, 415 (App. Div. 1999) (granting summary judgment because 
“there was no competent evidence set forth by the plaintiff that there was an alternative, safer design 
and the evidence clearly indicates the volatile solvent contained in the defendant’s quick-drying 
lacquer sealer is critical to the product’s performance”); Perez v. Radar Realty, No. 24414/1998, 
2005 WL 946710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 5, 2005), aff’d, 824 N.Y.S.2d 87 (App. Div. 2006) (summary 
judgment for defendant in a design defect claim against manufacturer of quick-drying lacquer sealer 
that injured plaintiff when it caught fire since there was no feasible alternative proffered by plaintiff 
that would meet the performance standards of the defendant’s product); see also Clinton v. Brown & 
Williamson Holdings, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (summary judgment granted to 
defendant on plaintiff’s claim that cigarettes were not reasonably safe when subject to risk/utility 
balancing). The court in Clinton began its analysis by saying: 
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D. Risk-Utility Balancing: Reasonable Alternative Design Not 
Required 
We have already noted that unless a jurisdiction is prepared to 
adopt category liability, the inevitable conclusion that one must draw 
from adopting risk-utility balancing is that plaintiff must prove a 
reasonable alternative design. When one does risk-utility balancing one 
must judge the product on trial and compare it with some hypothetical 
design that could have been adopted. Reasonable alternative design is the 
answer to the comparative balancing process; it is not a factor in the 
equation as to whether the product was reasonably designed.  
Thus, states like Colorado,140 Illinois,141 New Hampshire,142 and 
Nevada143 may say that reasonable alternative design is not a sina qua 
  
As an initial matter, the Court must determine whether the existence of a feasible 
alternative design is a sine qua non of the design defect claim . . . or whether it is merely 
one of several nonexclusive factors to be considered by the factfinder . . . . For the 
reasons stated below, the Court concludes that proof of a feasible alternative design is a 
prerequisite to establish a prima facie design defect claim under New York law. 
Clinton, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 646. The court then reasoned as follows: 
Although “the availability of a safer design” is listed by the court in Voss among several 
“nonexclusive” factors to be considered by the jury, the court in Voss also clearly stated 
that “[t]he plaintiff, of course, is under an obligation to present evidence that the product, 
as designed, was not reasonably safe because there was a substantial likelihood of harm 
and it was feasible to design the product in a safer manner.” This language indicates that 
the existence of a feasible alternative design is not just a “nonexclusive” factor, but rather 
is a requirement for Plaintiff’s prima facie case. Accordingly, New York courts have 
required Plaintiffs to demonstrate the feasibility of a safer alternative design to establish a 
prima facie design defect case.  
Id. (quoting Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (1983) (emphasis added)) (citations 
omitted); see also Sorto-Romero v. Delta Int’l Mach. Corp., No. 05-CV-5172 (SJF)(AKT), 2007 WL 
2816191, at *7-*10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2007) (applying New York law) (plaintiff’s expert testifying 
to alternative design that would have required an interlock mechanism on a wood shaper did not 
meet Daubert standards and plaintiff thus failed to make out a prima facie case for design defect); 
Kass ex rel. Kass v. West Bend Co., No. 02-CV-3719 (NGG), 2004 WL 2475606, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 4, 2004), aff’d, 158 F. App’x 352 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying New York law) (granting summary 
judgment to defendant-manufacturer of a coffee maker that scalded infant plaintiff with hot water 
when it turned over on the grounds that the alternative design proposed by plaintiff was not properly 
tested and thus did not meet Daubert standards); Colon ex rel. Molina v. BIC USA, Inc., 199 F. 
Supp. 2d 53, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (applying New York law) (plaintiff’s expert opinion on an 
alternative design of a child-proof cigarette lighter was not subjected to testing and did not meet 
Daubert standards). In granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment the federal district 
court in Colon ex rel. Molina said: “The presence of this factor in a design defect case also ensures 
that the focus of the jury’s deliberation is on whether the manufacturer could have designed a safer 
product, not on whether an expert’s proposed but untested hypothesis might bear fruit.” Id. 
 140 Colorado first adopted strict liability in Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d 276, 280 
(Colo. 1978), in accordance with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). In Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1986), overruled in part by Armentrout v. 
FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1992) (overruling Heath solely on the issue of placement of burden 
of proof for design defect—placing the burden on the plaintiff), Colorado “adopted a straightforward 
risk-benefit analysis.” See Barton v. Adams Rental, Inc., 938 P.2d 532, 537 (Colo. 1997) (plaintiff 
introduced evidence of an alternative design that would have avoided the injury; court granted 
judgment for defendant since there was no credible evidence that on balance the alternative design 
was safer). While the risk-utility standard incorporates consumer expectations, the high court 
explicitly rejected a design standard based exclusively on a consumer expectations test. See 
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non to make out a prima facie case for design defect. However, in these 
states, all classic design cases in which plaintiff has reached the jury are 
cases in which plaintiff has proved an alternative design. No plaintiff has 
ever reached the jury in the absence of such proof. The interesting 
question is why would courts make such a serious theoretical error? Why 
would they insist that reasonable alternative design is only a relevant 
factor in risk-utility balancing when, in actuality, they treat it as 
controlling? 
One reason is that many courts have relied on a highly influential 
article published in 1973 by the late Dean and Professor John Wade. In 
that article, Wade set forth seven risk-utility factors that should be 
considered in deciding whether a product design is unreasonably 
dangerous.144 One of the Wade factors is the availability of a safer design: 
“[t]he availability of a substitute product would meet the same need and 
not be as unsafe.”145 In a different setting, we observed that Wade was 
referring to the empirical question as to whether an alternative design 
was technologically feasible, whereas the issue of reasonable alternative 
  
Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1246-47 (Colo. 1987). While proof of a reasonable 
alternative design is part of Colorado’s risk-utility standard, it “is not always necessary.” See 
Armentrout, 842 P.2d at 185 n.11 (citing Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 
(Or. 1978)). Thus, according to Wilson and as cited by the high court, it would appear that the only 
exceptions to the reasonable alternative design requirement in Colorado are those cases where the 
product has negligible utility and high risk. 
 141 See supra Part IV.A. 
 142 In Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Industries, Inc., 784 A.2d 1178 (N.H. 2001), the 
court adopted the risk-utility approach as the governing standard for design defect litigation. It held, 
however, that it was not incumbent on the plaintiff to prove a reasonable alternative design as part of 
its prima facie case. The court rejected the reasonable alternative design requirement of the Products 
Liability Restatement as placing too heavy a burden on the plaintiff. Instead, whether a reasonable 
alternative design was available would be one of many factors to be taken into consideration in 
deciding whether a product was defective. Id. at 1182; see also Price v. BIC Corp., 702 A.2d 330, 
332 (N.H. 1997) (failure to incorporate child-proof features in cigarette lighter to be governed by 
risk-utility analysis). It is worthwhile to note that although the court held that proof of a reasonable 
alternative design is not required in each of the above cases, plaintiff offered proof of a reasonable 
alternative design to support its position that the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous. 
Vautour, 784 A.2d at 1184; see also Collins v. Tool Exch. LLC., No. Civ. 01-302-M, 2002 WL 
31395929, at *2 (D.N.H. Oct. 16, 2002) (summary judgment on design defect claim denied; plaintiff 
noted three design defects, the elimination of which would have rendered power saw safer). 
 143 Although Nevada courts have referred to the failure of a design to meet reasonable 
consumer expectations in explaining pro-plaintiff decisions, they have done so in cases involving 
product malfunctions. See, e.g., Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 470 P.2d 135, 137-38 (Nev. 1970). In 
more recent decisions, the Supreme Court of Nevada has made clear that plaintiffs may reach the 
jury by proving that an alternative design was available at time of sale, although “[a]lternative design 
is [only] one factor for the jury to consider when evaluating whether a product is unreasonably 
dangerous.” McCourt v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 734 P.2d 696, 698 (Nev. 1987); see also Robinson v. 
G.G.C. Inc., 808 P.2d 522, 525-26 (Nev. 1991) (holding that the failure to admit evidence of 
alternative design was grounds to reverse jury verdict for defendant). Notwithstanding this “only one 
factor” language in McCourt, no case in Nevada has been found, not involving product malfunction, 
in which a plaintiff has reached the jury with a design claim without proof of a reasonable alternative 
design. 
 144 John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 
837-38 (1973). For a critique of the Wade factors, see OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra 
note 9, § 8.4. 
 145 Wade, supra note 144, at 837.  
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design looks to the normative question as to whether the alternative 
design should have been implemented.146 However, that just makes the 
problem worse. How can the technological feasibility of an alternative 
design simply be a factor in deciding whether a product is defectively 
designed? As noted earlier, if there is no technologically feasible 
alternative, then the plaintiff perforce is attacking the product category. 
We are constrained to conclude that Wade was simply wrong in listing 
the availability of an alternative design as one factor among many in 
deciding whether a product design is unreasonably dangerous. A partial 
defense for Wade may be that in 1973 the issue of product category 
liability, although an early concern of products liability scholars at the 
time section 402A was adopted,147 was not on his radar screen. We 
reinvigorated the issue and popularized the phrase “category liability” in 
an article published in 1991;148 since then, scholars149 and courts150 have 
discussed the subject. Wade could not have been sensitive to the 
possibility that his formulation might lead to category liability.  
We conclude that the view that a court can embrace risk-utility 
balancing and yet insist that the availability of a reasonable alternative 
design is simply one factor in the equation has no practical significance. 
The only cases in which plaintiffs successfully dodge summary judgment 
without proof of a reasonable alternative design are those covered by 
section 3 of the Restatement, which allows a plaintiff to draw an 
inference of defect when the product fails in its manifestly intended 
function.151 This res ipsa-like inference has been widely recognized,152 
and the Restatement specifically provides that in those cases no 
  
 146 See Henderson & Twerski, Achieving Consensus, supra note 2, at 888-89.  
 147  See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 9, § 6.2; Joseph A. Page, Generic 
Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853 
(1983).  
 148 See Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 11, at 1297. 
 149 See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 9, § 10.3; Carl T. Bogus, War on 
the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products Liability, 60 MO. L. REV. 1, 8, 30, 36 
(1995); Owen, supra note 11; Ellen G. Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in the Eye; Product Category 
Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1429 (1994).  
 150 See, e.g., Becker v. Baron Bros., 649 A.2d 613, 620-21 (N.J. 1994) (in rejecting trial 
court’s jury instructions that all asbestos products were to be found defective as a matter of law and 
endorsing use of risk-utility analysis instead, court cited to Henderson & Twerski, Closing the 
Frontier, supra note 11, at 1314-15, for evidence that category liability law did not control in any 
jurisdiction); Rose v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 855 N.Y.S.2d 119 (App. Div. 2008), 
aff’d sub nom. Adamo v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 11 N.Y.3d 545 (2008). For a 
comprehensive discussion of the case law on category liability, see OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
LAW, supra note 9, § 10.3.  
 151 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (1998).  
 152 See, e.g., Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 17 F.3d 209, 211 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying 
Illinois law); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Dent-X Int’l, Inc., Civil No. 3:05 CV 1019(TPS), 2007 WL 
911841, at *3-*4 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 2007) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 
(1998)) (applying Connecticut law); Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 723 A.2d 45, 55 (N.J. 
1999) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (1998)); Speller ex rel. Miller v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 N.E.2d 252, 255 (N.Y. 2003) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (1998)). 
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reasonable alternative need be proffered.153 It may be that some courts are 
put off by the language of section 2(b), which seems to mandate a 
reasonable alternative design in all product design cases. Both section 2, 
comment f,154 and section 3, comment b,155 make it exquisitely clear that 
the Restatement does not mandate that result. In short, in jurisdictions 
that use risk-utility balancing as the test for design in classic design 
defect cases, no decisions have been reported in which plaintiffs have 
been able to reach juries without evidence that a reasonable alternative 
design was available that would have reduced or eliminated the risk of 
injury. 
  
 153 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 cmt. b (1998) (“[W]hen the 
incident . . . is one that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect, and evidence in the particular 
case establishes that the harm was not solely the result of causes other than product defect . . . , it 
should not be necessary for the plaintiff to incur the cost of proving whether the failure resulted from 
a manufacturer defect or from a defect in the design of the product.”).  
 154 Section 2, comment f provides: 
  While a plaintiff must prove that a reasonable alternative design would have reduced 
the foreseeable risks of harm, Subsection (b) does not require the plaintiff to produce 
expert testimony in every case. Cases arise in which the feasibility of a reasonable 
alternative design is obvious and understandable to laypersons and therefore expert 
testimony is unnecessary to support a finding that the product should have been designed 
differently and more safely. For example, when a manufacturer sells a soft stuffed toy 
with hard plastic buttons that are easily removable and likely to choke and suffocate a 
small child who foreseeably attempts to swallow them, the plaintiff should be able to 
reach the trier of fact with a claim that buttons on such a toy should be an integral part of 
the toy’s fabric itself (or otherwise be unremovable by an infant) without hiring an expert 
to demonstrate the feasibility of an alternative safer design. Furthermore, other products 
already available on the market may serve the same or very similar function at lower risk 
and at comparable cost. Such products may serve as reasonable alternatives to the product 
in question.   
Id. § 2 cmt. f. 
 155 Section 3, comment b allows an inference of design defect without proof of a 
reasonable alternative design: 
  Although the rules in this Section, for the reasons just stated, most often apply to 
manufacturing defects, occasionally a product design causes the product to malfunction 
in a manner identical to that which would ordinarily be caused by a manufacturing defect. 
Thus, an aircraft may inadvertently be designed in such a way that, in new condition and 
while flying within its intended performance parameters, the wings suddenly and 
unexpectedly fall off, causing harm. In theory, of course, the plaintiff in such a case 
would be able to show how other units in the same production line were designed, 
leading to a showing of a reasonable alternative design under § 2(b). As a practical 
matter, however, when the incident involving the aircraft is one that ordinarily occurs as a 
result of product defect, and evidence in the particular case establishes that the harm was 
not solely the result of causes other than product defect existing at time of sale, it should 
not be necessary for the plaintiff to incur the cost of proving whether the failure resulted 
from a manufacturing defect or from a defect in the design of the product. Section 3 
allows the trier of fact to draw the inference that the product was defective whether due to 
a manufacturing defect or a design defect. Under those circumstances, the plaintiff need 
not specify the type of defect responsible for the product malfunction. 
Id. § 3 cmt. b. 
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E. The Two-Prong Test for Defect 
Some jurisdictions apply a two-prong test for defect under which 
a plaintiff can establish design defect by demonstrating either that (1) the 
product failed to meet consumer expectations; or (2) the product failed to 
meet risk-utility standards. Arizona,156 Alaska,157 California,158 
Connecticut,159 Florida,160 Hawaii,161 Ohio,162 Oregon,163 Puerto Rico,164 
Tennessee,165 and Washington166 appear to fall in this camp. 
  
 156 See Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 879, 881-82 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc); 
Golonka v. Gen. Motors Corp., 65 P.3d 956, 962-63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).  
 157 Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 884 (Alaska 1979) (citing Barker v. 
Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443, 457-58 (Cal. 1978)) (adopting California’s two-prong test 
for imposing design-based liability), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act effective June 11, 
1986, 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 139 (1986), as recognized by Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 14 
P.3d 990 (Alaska 2000). Under this test, a product is defective:  
(1) if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary 
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or 
(2) if the plaintiff proves that the product’s design proximately caused his injury and the 
defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors discussed above, that on balance 
the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design. 
Barker, 573 P.2d at 457-58. In General Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1220 (Alaska 
1998), the Supreme Court of Alaska reaffirmed its use of the consumer expectations test without 
requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design. 
 158 See Barker, 573 P.2d at 457-58; see also discussion accompanying notes infra 170-
174.  
 159 See Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333-34 (Conn. 1997); see 
infra notes 176-178 and accompanying text. 
 160 Florida case law supports the two-prong test for defect. See, e.g., Force v. Ford Motor 
Co., 879 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). A large number of cases that rely on the 
consumer expectations test are cases that would be decided identically under section 3 of the 
Products Liability Restatement. As the court notes in Force, Florida law is not clear as to the line of 
demarcation between cases that can be decided under the consumer expectations test and those 
which require risk-utility balancing. Id. at 106-07. The court does, however, note that there are cases 
of such complexity that the ordinary consumer would not know what to expect and would require 
risk-utility balancing to set the standard for defect. Id. at 109. From the onset the Florida courts 
acknowledged that the consumer expectations test is problematic in classic design defect cases. In 
the much cited case of Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), the court 
said: 
The consumer expectation standard, though adequate to identify unintended 
manufactured defects, is more difficult to apply as to the other two generally recognized 
types of product defects: (1) design defects—those which are due to design error because 
unforeseen hazards accompany normal use of the product created according to design, 
and (2) defects resulting from misinformation or inadequate warnings. As to the last two 
defects, the standard is said to be a very vague and imprecise one because the ordinary 
consumer cannot be said to have expectations as to safety regarding many features of 
complexly made products that are purchased, such as the risk of fire from the way 
gasoline tanks are installed in cars, or the magnitude of risks involved in vehicles 
overturning. Due to the difficulty in applying the consumer expectation standard to all 
types of product defects, many thoughtful commentators have suggested that it should be 
rejected, particularly as to those defects arising from design, in favor of a test that would 
weigh the utility of the design versus the magnitude of the inherent risk. 
Id. at 1145. More recently, in Liggett Group, Inc. v. Davis, 973 So. 2d 467, 473-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2007), the issue before the court was whether it should adopt section 2(b) of the Products 
Liability Restatement in the context of a claim alleging a design defect in cigarettes. The court found 
that plaintiff had not presented evidence of a reasonable alternative design and upheld a jury verdict 
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based on the consumer expectations test. Id. The case was appealed to the Florida Supreme Court 
and it at first accepted jurisdiction to review the intermediate appellate court’s decision. See Liggett 
Group Inc. v. Davis, 997 So. 2d 400, 401 (Fla. 2008). Then after oral argument, the court declined 
jurisdiction. Id. Florida law thus remains uncertain as to when it is proper to use the consumer 
expectations test and when a case requires risk-utility balancing. 
 161 Acoba v. Gen. Tire Co., 986 P.2d 288, 304 (Haw. 1999). Though the Acoba court said 
that plaintiff could proceed under both consumer expectations and risk/utility, plaintiff introduced 
evidence of a design alternative that would have avoided the injury. Id. 
 162 Ohio has a bifurcated statute governing design-based liability. The statute, OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2307.75 (A)-(F), provides two avenues for imposing design-based liability. “[A] 
product design is in a defective condition to the user or consumer if (1) it is more dangerous than an 
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) 
if the benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the risk inherent in such design.” Knitz v. 
Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio 1982). Despite presenting alternate bases of design-
based liability, subsection (F) provides:  
A product is not defective in design or formulation if, at the time the product left the 
control of its manufacturer, a practical and technically feasible alternative design or 
formulation was not available that would have prevented the harm for which the claimant 
seeks to recover compensatory damages without substantially impairing the usefulness or 
intended purpose of the product.  
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(F) (LexisNexis 2005). Ohio courts largely track the above-
mentioned statutory requirements but support the proposition that a plaintiff can proceed either 
under consumer expectations or risk-utility balancing. See Pruitt v. Gen. Motors Corp., 599 N.E.2d 
723, 726 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Aldridge v. Reckart Equip. Co., No. 04CA17, 2006 WL 2716696, at 
*11 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2006). 
 163 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.920 (2007) adopts section 402A, including comments a through 
m, as the law governing products liability in Oregon. In McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 
320, 329-30 (Or. 2001), the Oregon Supreme Court said that it was bound by the legislative 
determination set forth in section 402A, comment i (consumer expectations test). The court then 
said: 
Plaintiff acknowledges that evidence related to risk-utility balancing of that kind may 
be necessary to show that a product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer 
would have expected. However, plaintiff disputes the Court of Appeals’ holding that, 
under the consumer expectations test, a plaintiff must introduce such evidence. See 
McCathern, 160 Or. App. at 211, 985 P.2d 804 (proof of safer practicable alternative 
design essential to consumer risk-utility theory). According to plaintiff, evidence related 
to risk-utility balancing, as described above, is required only under the now-defunct 
reasonable manufacturer test. See Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 282 Or. 61, 67-
69, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978) (relying on Phillips’s reasonable manufacturer test; requiring 
that, when risk-utility balancing and proof of design alternative are necessary, proof must 
include evidence that alternative design was practicable).  
We agree that evidence related to risk-utility balancing, which may include proof that 
a practicable and feasible design alternative was available, will not always be necessary 
to prove that a product’s design is defective and unreasonably dangerous, i.e., that the 
product failed to meet ordinary consumer expectations. However, because the parties did 
not dispute that evidence related to risk-utility balancing was necessary in this case, we 
leave for another day the question under what circumstances ORS 30.920 requires a 
plaintiff to support a product liability design-defect claim with evidence related to risk-
utility balancing of the kind discussed above. 
 
McCathern, 23 P.3d at 331-32. 
 164 In Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 149 F.3d 23, 24 (1st Cir. 1998), involving 
a claim that an airbag in an automobile was defectively designed, the federal court of appeals 
reviewed Puerto Rico’s products liability law in affirming a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff-
appellee. The court’s Erie-educated guess regarding Puerto Rican law, based on prior decisions by 
the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, was that the two-prong approach adopted in California in Barker 
v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443 (1978), applied. Collazo-Santiago, 149 F.3d at 25-26. 
Notwithstanding expert testimony from defendant’s witnesses that the benefits of the airbag 
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To the extent that these states utilize risk-utility balancing, we 
have already demonstrated that it inevitably leads to requiring proof of a 
reasonable alternative design.167 The questions of real import concern 
how the courts administer the consumer expectations test. What are the 
parameters of the test? By what barometer does one measure whether 
consumer expectations have been disappointed? Unless the consumer 
expectations test is carefully cabined, it is open to telling criticisms. First, 
for many products, consumers do not have clear expectations as to how 
the product will perform when subjected to a broad range of uses. 
Second, under the consumer expectations test, defect and causation are 
merged. Plaintiffs need only allege disappointment of expectations and 
injury. Third, since risk-utility is not an issue, the product as designed 
may provide greater overall safety than an alternative product that would 
meet consumer expectations and would have avoided a particular 
plaintiff’s harm. Fourth, consumer expectations may vary; thus placing 
  
outweighed its risks overall and that no reasonable alternative design was feasible, the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals concluded that after the plaintiff proved that deployment of the airbag caused the 
second-degree burns to the plaintiff’s face, “the burden shifted to the defendant to establish that the 
benefits of the design outweighed its risks . . . . The jury was not required to believe the testimony of 
the defendant’s expert witness regarding the feasibility of an alternative design or the other Barker 
factors . . . .” Id. at 27-28. More recently, in Fremaint v. Ford Motor Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26, 30-
31 (D.P.R. 2003), the federal district court, applying Puerto Rican law, granted summary judgment 
for defendant in a case involving second-collision injuries suffered in a single-car accident. The 
court held that the consumer expectation prong of the Barker two-prong approach did not apply 
because the case involved complex technical matters of automobile design, and the plaintiff failed to 
introduce expert testimony to establish that an alternative, safer design was feasible that would have 
avoided plaintiff’s injuries in the accident. Id. at 29-30. 
 165 Jackson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 60 S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. 2001); see also discussion infra 
notes 181-186 and accompanying text.  
 166 WASH. REV. CODE § 7.720.030(3) (1981) imposes strict liability for design defects and 
provides that “[i]n determining whether a product was not reasonably safe under this section, the 
trier of fact shall consider whether the product was unsafe to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary consumer.”  
  It would at first blush seem that Washington allows a plaintiff to prevail under a pure 
consumer expectations test. However, in several cases the court has included risk-utility factors as 
necessary to determine whether plaintiff meets the consumer expectations test. See, e.g., Bruns v. 
PACCAR, Inc., 890 P.2d 469 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995), where the court said: 
Alternatively, the plaintiff may establish manufacturer liability by showing the product 
was unsafe as contemplated by a reasonable consumer. RCW 7.72.030(3). Several factors 
contribute to this consumer expectation determination, including “[t]he relative cost of 
the product, the gravity of the potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost and 
feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk[.]”  
Id. at 474 (quoting Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1975) (en banc)); see 
also Higgins v. Intex Recreation Corp., 99 P.3d 421 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004), where the court said:  
In determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer, a number of factors 
must be considered. The relative cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm 
from the claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk 
may be relevant in a particular case. In other instances the nature of the product or the 
nature of the claimed defect may make other factors relevant to the issue. 
 
Id. at 426 . 
 167 See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.  
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the manufacturer in the impossible position of being subject to liability 
no matter how the product is designed. 
For these reasons, courts in these two-prong states have been 
very sensitive to the limitations of the consumer expectations test and 
have confined its application to cases that instantiate res ipsa-like product 
failures i.e., where a product fails to perform its manifestly intended 
function. We have made reference to section 3 of the Products Liability 
Restatement earlier in this paper. At this juncture we set it out in full. 
§ 3. Circumstantial Evidence Supporting Inference of Product Defect 
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a 
product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without proof of a 
specific defect, when the incident that harmed the plaintiff: 
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect; and 
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other than product 
defect existing at the time of sale or distribution.168 
To the extent that a court recognizes that if a product does not 
fall within section 3 the plaintiff must establish that the product fails to 
meet risk-utility norms, the law of that jurisdiction is perfectly congruent 
with the Products Liability Restatement. For example, in its leading case 
Dart v. Wiebe Mfg.,169 the Arizona Supreme Court noted that the 
consumer expectations test is adequate for manufacturing defect cases 
but will only “sometimes work well” in design cases, as consumers will 
very often not know what to expect of a complex or unfamiliar design. 
More recently in Golonka v. General Motors Corp.,170 the Arizona Court 
of Appeals reiterated that the consumer expectations test works well for 
manufacturing defect cases and has “limited utility” in design defect 
cases where risk-utility standards must govern.171 California, the 
originator of the two-prong test in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,172 later 
found it necessary in Soule v. General Motors Corp.173 to explain that the 
consumer expectations test is very limited in scope. The court said: 
As we have seen, the consumer expectations test is reserved for cases in which 
the everyday experience of the product’s users permits a conclusion that the 
product’s design violated minimum safety assumptions, and is thus defective 
regardless of expert opinion about the merits of the design . . . .174 [T]he jury 
may not be left free to find a violation of ordinary consumer expectations 
whenever it chooses. Unless the facts actually permit an inference that the 
product’s performance did not meet the minimum safety expectations of its 
  
 168  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (1998). 
 169 709 P.2d 876, 878 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc).  
 170 65 P.3d 956, 962 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).  
 171 Id. 
 172 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).  
 173 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994).  
 174 Id. at 308. 
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ordinary users, the jury must engage in the balancing of risks and benefits 
required by the second prong of Barker.175 
 
In two telling footnotes the court outlined the proper role of each of the 
two prongs. As to the consumer expectations test, the court said the 
following: 
For example, the ordinary consumers of modern automobiles may and do 
expect that such vehicles will be designed so as not to explode while idling at 
stoplights, experience sudden steering or brake failure as they leave the 
dealership or roll over and catch fire in two-mile-per-hour collisions. If the 
plaintiff in a product liability action proved that a vehicle’s design produced 
such a result, the jury could find forthwith that the car failed to perform as 
safely as its ordinary consumers would expect, and was therefore defective.176 
The Court went out of its way in rejecting the attempt by plaintiff to 
broaden the scope of the consumer expectations test saying: 
Plaintiff insists that manufacturers should be forced to design their products to 
meet the “objective” safety demands of a “hypothetical” reasonable consumer 
who is fully informed about what he or she should expect. Hence, plaintiff 
reasons, the jury may receive expert advice on “reasonable” safety expectations 
for the product. However, this function is better served by the risk-benefit 
prong of Barker. There, juries receive expert advice, apply clear guidelines, and 
decide accordingly whether the product’s design is an acceptable compromise 
of competing considerations.177  
Connecticut, as we explained earlier, has formally rejected the 
Products Liability Restatement test for design defect. Yet it limits its 
consumer expectations test to cases where an ordinary consumer is “able 
to form expectations of safety.”178 In cases involving issues of complex 
product design, the court admits that risk-utility balancing must be 
utilized in order to decide whether a design is defective.  As noted 
earlier, in Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.,179 the seminal 
Connecticut case pronouncing this two-prong analysis, the plaintiff 
presented evidence of several reasonable alternative designs that were 
readily available and that would have minimized or eliminated the injury 
to the plaintiff. Since Potter, the Connecticut cases in which the 
consumer expectations test has been applied by state and federal courts 
are all res ipsa-like cases in which the inference of defect was entirely 
appropriate under section 3 of the Restatement.180  
  
 175 Id. at 309. 
 176 Id. at 308 n.3. 
 177 Id. at 308 n.4.  
 178 Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333 (Conn. 1997).  
 179 Id. 
 180 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. DENT-X Int’l, Inc., No. 3:05CV1019 (TPS), 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20858 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 2007); Moran v. E. Equip. Sales, Inc., 818 A.2d 848 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 2003); Martone v. C. Raimondo & Sons Constr., No. CV000704975S, 2002 WL 31234758 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2002).  
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Tennessee’s Product Liability Act embraces a two-prong test for 
design defect similar to the tests in Arizona and California. In Jackson v. 
General Motors Corp.,181 the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the 
consumer expectations test was not limited to the malfunction of simple 
products but could apply to complex products as well. It will be noted, 
however, that the court also observed that “plaintiffs, in cases involving 
highly complex products,” will often be unable “to establish that the 
product is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by an ordinary consumer.”182 This caveat was applied in 
Brown v. The Raymond Corp.183 where a plaintiff was driving his forklift 
when he collided with a forklift driven by another employee. The wheel 
well of the other employee’s forklift entered the operator compartment of 
the plaintiff’s forklift, crushing his left foot. Plaintiff’s expert testified 
that the defendant’s forklift was defectively designed because the 
company could have eliminated the hazard of its forklift’s wheel 
intruding into the compartment of another. The trial court found that the 
plaintiff’s expert testimony did not meet Daubert standards and was 
inadmissible.184 Plaintiff argued that even though he had not satisfied the 
risk-utility prong for design defect, he was entitled to take the case to the 
jury under the consumer expectations test.185 In rejecting the plaintiff’s 
argument, the court noted that, notwithstanding the broad language in 
Jackson that the consumer expectations test could be applied to complex 
products, the requirement that the product be more dangerous than 
expected by the ordinary consumer could not be met in this case.186 The 
complexity of the product would not allow for such an inference of 
defect. 
We need not deluge the reader with cases in which the courts 
have held that the consumer expectations test is inappropriate and the 
case requires risk-utility balancing. If one needs reminding, the Soule 
case in California was a crashworthiness case in which the court held that 
the consumer expectations test was improper and required risk-utility 
balancing.187 As we see it, most cases in which the courts have imposed 
liability under consumer expectations and have not required risk-utility 
balancing are cases that would have met the test set forth in section 3 of 
the Products Liability Restatement. A few cases may be found in which 
courts, in our opinion, have given an overly broad reading to the 
  
 181 60 S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. 2001).  
 182 Id. at 806.  
 183 432 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2005).  
 184 Id. at 642-43.  
 185 Id. at 644.  
 186 Id.  
 187 Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 309 (Cal. 1994) (“Unless the facts actually 
permit an inference that the product’s performance did not meet the minimum safety expectations of 
its ordinary users, the jury must engage in the balancing of risks and benefits . . . .”).  
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consumer expectations test.188 Would results in those states that have 
given a broader reading to consumer expectations than is to our liking 
have been different had the court applied the language of section 3? That 
is hard to tell. The res ipsa doctrine has had an accordion-like quality to 
it and courts have at times given it an expansive reading.189 One fact is 
undeniable. Those courts that have opted for a two-prong test for design 
defect manifest by that doctrinal choice that they understand that the 
consumer expectations test has serious limitations and cannot be the 
exclusive test for design liability. Although we do not formally count 
them as states that agree with the Products Liability Restatement, the 
reality is that when one considers sections 2 and 3 together and lines 
them up with the law of: (1) the states that require proof of a reasonable 
alternative design; (2) the states that profess to apply risk-utility 
balancing; and (3) the two-prong states, the consensus that support the 
general approach of the Products Liability Restatement is overwhelming. 
We never anticipated that we would persuade states to speak in the same 
dialect. But they are, in fact, speaking in one common language. 
F. The Pure Consumer Expectation States 
A handful of states embrace the consumer expectations test as 
the sole standard for defect. Thus, Kansas,190 Maryland,191 Nebraska,192 
Oklahoma,193 and Wisconsin194 all profess allegiance to the consumer 
  
 188 See, e.g., Bresnahan v. Chrysler Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (Ct. App. 1995) (plaintiff 
was injured when her car was rear-ended and the air barg inflated in a low speed collision; court held 
that plaintiff was entitled to go to the jury on consumer expectations theory and that risk-utility 
evidence as to the effectiveness of air bags was not relevant); Force v. Ford Motor Co., 879 So. 2d 
103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (consumer expectations test appropriate for injury allegedly caused by 
a defective seatbelt shoulder harness). But see Pruitt v. Gen. Motors Corp., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 4 (Ct. 
App. 1999) (On facts similar to Breshnahan, the appellate court upheld a trial court finding that the 
consumer expectations test was inappropriate.). For other cases indicating that California courts 
generally read the consumer expectations test narrowly, see HENDERSON AND TWERSKI, supra note 
9, at 287.  
 189 See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 9, § 2.5; DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW 
OF TORTS §§ 154-55 (2000); PROSSER AND KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 39 (1984); HENDERSON 
& TWERSKI, supra note 9, at 176. 
 190 See Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930 (Kan. 2000). Answering a certified 
question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the Kansas high court announced that 
it rejected the Restatement (Third) standard and “adopted the consumer expectations test . . . .” Id. at 
946. It should be borne in mind that in Delaney, the plaintiff had clearly proven a reasonable 
alternative design case sufficient to reach the jury under the Restatement (Third) section 2(b) test. 
 191 See infra note 193 and accompanying text.  
 192 See Haag v. Bongers, 589 N.W.2d 318, 329 (Neb. 1999) (approving earlier case law 
that refused to require plaintiffs to prove a reasonable alternative design); Kudlacek v. Fiat, S.p.A., 
509 N.W.2d 603, 610 (Neb. 1994); Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Neb. 1987). 
 193 In Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1360 (Okla. 1974), the court 
adopted the consumer expectations test. There is a dearth of Oklahoma cases utilizing the consumer 
expectations test in classic design defect cases. The consumer expectations test has been applied to 
section 3 res ipsa-like cases. See, e.g., Dutsch v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 845 P.2d 187, 190 (Okla. 
1992).  
 194 In Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794 
(Wis. 1975), Wisconsin adopted the consumer expectations test. More recently, in Green v. Smith & 
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expectations test. In the case of Maryland there is good reason to believe 
that the issue is not settled and that risk-utility balancing will ultimately 
prevail in classic design defect cases. 
For almost two decades, Maryland utilized risk-utility balancing 
and required proof of a reasonable alternative design to make out a prima 
facie case of design defect.195 Then, in what appeared to be an abrupt 
reversal in Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,196 the Supreme Court 
embraced the consumer expectations test. Plaintiffs’ decedent, a three-
year old boy, shot himself while playing with his father’s handgun. The 
gun was sold with a lock box in which to store the gun, the magazine, 
and a padlock for the box. The instruction manual set forth multiple 
warnings about storing the handgun with special cautionary instructions 
about storing the gun away from children. There were also warnings that 
ammunition should be stored separately from the firearm. The boy’s 
father disregarded virtually every one of the warnings. Rather than 
putting the gun in the lock box, he placed it under his mattress and kept 
the loaded magazine on a bookshelf in the same room so that it was 
visible and accessible to his son. The child found the gun and the 
magazine. From watching television he knew how to load the magazine 
into the gun. While playing with the loaded handgun, he shot and killed 
himself. 
Plaintiff alleged that the gun was defective and unreasonably 
dangerous, suggesting a host of alternative designs that would have 
substantially reduced the likelihood that a young child could fire the 
gun.197 After a lengthy discussion of earlier Maryland cases, the court 
concluded that it would not apply a risk-utility standard to handguns and 
would bar the action because the gun met consumer expectations. The 
court said: 
It is clear that under the consumer expectations test that . . . no cause of action 
had been stated in this case. There was no malfunction of the gun; regrettably it 
worked exactly as it was designed and intended to work and as any ordinary 
consumer would have expected it to work. The gun is a lawful weapon and was 
lawfully sold. What caused this tragedy was the carelessness of [the] father in 
leaving the weapon and the magazine in places where the child was able to find 
them, in contravention not only of common sense but of multiple warnings 
given to him at the time of purchase.198  
  
Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 751-52 (Wis. 2001), the court reiterated its support for the 
consumer expectations test and rejected the section 2(b) standard of the Products Liability 
Restatement.  
 195 See, e.g., Singleton v. Int’l Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 114-15 (4th Cir. 1981) 
(applying Maryland law); Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 539 A.2d 701, 707 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1988); Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 488 A.2d 516, 519-20 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).  
 196 792 A.2d 1145 (Md. 2002). 
 197 Id. at 1148.  
 198 Id. at 1158.  
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The court then noted that, given the controversy surrounding the risk-
utility standard of the Products Liability Restatement and given the fact 
that the legislature had enacted its own standard for the sale and 
distribution of handguns, it would not adopt the risk-utility test for 
handguns.199  
Although the consumer expectations test is generally considered 
to be more favorable to plaintiffs, a rigorous application of the test as the 
sole grounds for deciding defect would result in negating legitimate 
plaintiffs’ claims when a product satisfies consumer expectations, 
perhaps because the risks are obvious, but could be made safer by 
adopting reasonable alternative designs.200 Nonetheless, in comments 
written shortly after Halliday, we predicted that Maryland courts would 
revert to risk-utility balancing in classic design defect cases by declaring 
that consumers have a right to expect reasonably designed products.201 
Several post-Halliday cases have proven our prediction to be accurate.202 
Although the consumer expectations test may occasionally be used as a 
shield against liability, when the issue is whether a product was 
reasonably designed, Maryland courts will resort to risk-utility balancing 
and will not simply allow a plaintiff to recover based on disappointed 
consumer expectations.  
CONCLUSION 
One may quibble with our assessments here and there regarding 
whether one state or another has fully adopted risk-utility/reasonable 
alternative design as the standard for design defect liability. But in the 
broad view of the national landscape set forth in this Article, there is 
little doubt that risk-utility balancing has carried the day.203 The 
  
 199 Id. at 1159 (“Given the controversy that continues to surround the risk-utility standard 
articulated for design defect cases in § 2 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD), we are reluctant at this point 
to cast aside our existing jurisprudence in favor of such an approach on any broad, general basis . . . . 
So far, the Legislature has chosen not to place these burdens on gun manufacturers but has attempted 
to deal with the problem in other ways. We shall respect that policy choice.”).   
 200 Clayton v. Deere & Co., No. 05-3377, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47371 (D. Md. June 27, 
2007) (summary judgment granted to defendant against claim that a lawnmower was defectively 
designed because dangers were known to a reasonable consumer); Halliday, 792 A.2d at 1158. 
 201 See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. AND AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: 
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 266-67 (5th ed. 2004).  
 202 Higginbotham v. KCS Int’l, 85 F. App’x 911 (4th Cir. 2004) (utilizing risk-utility 
balancing in deciding that swim ladder of a yacht was not defectively designed); Celmer v. 
Jumpking Inc., No. 04-3959, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34104 (D. Md. May 26, 2006) (denying motion 
for summary judgment to manufacturer of trampoline relying on risk-utility balancing to show that 
an alternative design was available that would have prevented plaintiff’s injury); Hoon v. Lightolier, 
L.L.C., 857 A.2d 1184, 1195-96 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (discussing use of risk-utility balancing 
in Maryland design defect litigation and citing to section 2(b) of Products Liability Restatement), 
rev’d on other grounds, 876 A.2d 100 (Md. 2005). 
 203 The issue is still unclear in only six states: Pennsylvania, Idaho, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Wyoming, and Vermont.  
  Whether Pennsylvania will adopt section 2 of the Products Liability Restatement will 
shortly be decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The issue is before them in Bugosh v. I.U. 
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North America Inc., 942 A.2d 897, 897 (Pa. 2008). In South Dakota, the superior court, in Engberg 
v. Ford Motor Company, 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973), adopted section 402A. We have found no 
cases interpreting the standard for design defect in classic design defect cases.  
  The case law on design defect in North Dakota is similarly sparse. N.D. CENT. CODE 
§§ 28-01.3-05 to 28-01.3-06(4) (2006) set forth the consumer expectations test as the test for defect. 
The first case, see Johnson v. Am. Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974), involved a driver and 
passenger of an automobile who were incinerated when the gasoline tank exploded when struck from 
behind by another automobile. Id. at 59. The lower court granted summary judgment for the 
manufacturer, holding that the manufacturer was under no duty to make the automobile accident-
proof. Id. at 62. On appeal, the high court reversed and remanded, indicating that the issue—whether 
a reasonable alternative design to the gasoline tank would have prevented the injury—was for the 
trier of fact. While the high court in Johnson adopted strict liability in tort, the standard applied was 
negligent design. Id. at 65. The second case, see Endresen v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop, Inc., 
560 N.W.2d 225 (N.D. 1997), involved a man who was permanently blinded in his right eye when 
his handgun exploded when he attempted to shoot an overloaded cartridge. Id. at 227. The lower 
court, without a jury, granted judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $259,079.21. Id. An expert 
for the plaintiff testified that the use of reloaded ammunition was a common and foreseeable 
practice. Id. Further, the expert testified that other brands of firearms were designed to withstand 
reloaded ammunition. Id. Given that there is no judicial interpretation of the statute and that the few 
cases dealing with design defect were supported by reasonable alternative design, we believe that the 
standard for design defect is undecided in North Dakota.  
  Many Idaho cases deal with the issue of when courts may draw an inference of defect 
without having to prove a specific defect. These are invariably res ipsa-like cases that are totally 
consistent with section 3 of the Products Liability Restatement. See, e.g., Fitting v. Dell Catalog 
Sales USA, No. CV-06-23-S-LMB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41946 (D. Idaho May 21, 2008); 
Bachman FXC Corp., No. CV-06-140-2-JLQ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20938 (D. Idaho Mar. 21, 
2007); Mortenson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 693 P.2d 1038 (Idaho 1984). Few cases deal with the 
standard of design defect. Aside from noting that Idaho adopted section 402A for both 
manufacturing and design defects, see Rindilsbaker v. Wilson, 519 P.2d 421 (1974), the cases do not 
address the standard for design defect. However, in Pate v. Columbia Machine, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 
451 (D. Idaho 1996), plaintiff’s hand was crushed when he sought to break up a jam in a block 
splitting machine. Plaintiff alleged that the machine was defectively designed in that it did not have a 
guard that would have prevented the accident. In rejecting plaintiff’s claim the court said that 
plaintiff’s counsel “did not point the Court to any expert testimony concerning such a guard, and did 
not refer to any ANSI standard that would require such a guard. In the absence of such evidence, the 
Court is left to speculate as to the feasibility, cost, function, availability and suitability of such 
modifications to the machine.” Id. at 460; see also Curtis v. DeAtley, 663 P.2d 1089 (Idaho 1983) 
(housekeeper injured when the chandelier she was cleaning fell on her; court reversed trial court’s 
grant of directed verdict against the distributor because the plaintiff’s expert suggested two 
alternative designs that would have prevented the accident). 
  Wyoming has few cases discussing the issue of the standard for deciding design defect 
cases. However, in Campell v. Studer, Inc., 970 P.2d 389, 392 (Wyo. 1998), the court cited to the 
text of section 2(b) in deciding a design defect case. Plaintiff had been thrown from an asphalt 
compactor and was killed with the compactor rolled over him. Plaintiff’s expert posited an 
alternative design on the grounds that the expert’s testimony was insufficient to support the 
proposition that the alternative design was practical. After citing to section 2(b) the court said: 
The requirement that plaintiff show the existence of a reasonable alternative design as an 
element of her claim has been the subject of extensive debate. Comments b and e to this 
section, however, suggest an alternative design may not be necessary in every design 
defect case. We need not enter the debate at this time because Campbell’s allegations 
clearly rest on her contention that a feasible alternative design was available. 
Id. at 392 n.1. It is important that the court noted to the comments to section 2(b) that indicate that 
the Products Liability Restatement does not always require proof of a reasonable alternative design. 
This would indicate that the court understands the subtlety of the Restatement and would be more 
likely to adopt it. Nonetheless, in our opinion, we would categorize Wyoming as a state that is 
leaning toward adoption of Restatement section 2(b) and its comments. 
  Not many Vermont cases, both on the state and federal level, deal directly with the 
standard for design-based liability. Vermont adopted the doctrine of strict products liability in 1975, 
in accordance with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See Zaleskie v. Joyce, 
333 A.2d 110, 113-14 (Vt. 1975). Subsequent high court decisions indicate that design-based 
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overwhelming majority of cases that rely on consumer expectations as 
the theory for imposing liability do so only in res ipsa-like situations in 
which an inference of defect can be drawn from the happening of a 
product-related accident. We do not disagree with those holdings. 
Indeed, section 3 of the Products Liability Restatement enthusiastically 
supports the principle that there is no need to prove a reasonable 
alternative design when a product fails to perform its manifestly intended 
function.204 
Putting legal theory aside, the simple reality is that plaintiffs 
base their design defect claims on the availability of a reasonable 
alternative design. They are compelled by logic to do so. They must be 
able to explain to juries what is wrong with a product. The only way to 
do so is to posit a better, safer design. When their experts falter in 
providing credible evidence that a reasonable alternative design was 
available, they almost always face Daubert challenges. If they do not 
survive the Daubert challenge, they cannot fall back on the consumer 
expectations test. Where plaintiffs cannot establish product malfunction 
they must establish that the product failed to meet the risk-utility 
standard. They live or die by their ability to establish a reasonable 
alternative design. The test for design defect set forth in the Products 
Liability Restatement merges sound legal theory and actual litigation 
practice. It will stand the test of time.  
  
jurisprudence in Vermont remains largely undeveloped. See Farnham v. Bombardier, Inc., 640 A.2d 
47 (Vt. 1994); see also Webb v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 692 A.2d 343 (Vt. 1996). Farnham 
involved a plaintiff who suffered a head injury when he was thrown off his snowmobile while 
driving at high speeds. Farnham, 640 A.2d at 48. Plaintiff claimed that the snowmobile was 
defectively designed with regard to its ability to break at high speeds. Id. The lower court granted 
summary judgment for the defendant in a strict products liability action. Id. On appeal, the high 
court affirmed, citing the open and obvious nature of the risk involved in addition to the failure of 
the plaintiff’s expert to establish a design defect. Id. at 49. The high court did not address nor expand 
upon any of the customary design-based tests.  
 204 See supra note 151. 
